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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHARON L. HEATONf 
Applicant and Appellant, 
vs. 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
Industrial Commission 
Case yo. B85000588 
Administrative Law Judge: 
Judge Timothy C. Allen 
Court of Appeals No. 870336-CA 
Priority No. 6 
JURISDICTION 
This is an action for review ar^ d determination of the 
lav/fulness of an award of the Industrial 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction by v 
§ 35-1-83. 
Commission of Utah. The 
Irtue of Utah Code Ann., 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is a Petition for Review of the failure of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah to order permanent total workers1 
compensation benefits to injured employee Sharon L. Heaton from 
the date of total disability expressed in| the order dated July 6, 
1987. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented are as follows: 
1. Whether there is any eyidence to support the 
finding of a July 25, 1985, commencement date for permanent total 
disability benefits; 
2. Whether deterioration of condition is necessary 
before benefits for permanent and total disability can commence in 
the case of a worker who previously was found to be permanently 
and totally disabled; 
3. Whether the "odd-lot" doctrine places the burden on 
the party or parties contesting permanent total disability to 
prove there is employment available in the marketplace for the 
applicant before the benefits can be denied; and, 
4. Whether it is the province of a medical panel to 
make findings as to employability or whether the determination of 
employability is solely an administrative function. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Statutes, cases, and authorities believed to be determinative 
of the respective issues raised include §§ 35-1-67, 35-1-83, and 
35-1-84, Utah Code Ann.; Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 82 N.M. 
424, 483 P.2d 305 (1970); Marshall v. Indus. Com'n of State of 
Utah, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984); Savage v. Industrial Comm., 565 
P.2d 782 (Utah 1977); Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 
725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986). The statutes are set forth verbatim in 
the addendum hereto. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CftSE 
A. The Nature of the Case 
This case involves the claim of an injured worker, Appellant 
Sharon L. Heaton, to statutorily prescribed benefits for permanent 
total disability. There is no issue as to appellant's disability, 
but a dispute as to the propriety of the Industrial Commission's 
award of payments due from the Second Injury Fund. The Commission 
affirmed the administrative law judge in ordering Fund payments to 
commence July 25, 1985, almost 4 year^ after the time that the 
payments to be made by the applicant's employer/insurance carrier 
terminated, October 5r 1981. From the statements of the 
administrative law judge in the order the Commission affirmed, it 
appears the judge and the Commission sought a date at which the 
applicant's permanent total disability "deteriorated" for 
commencement of Fund benefits. It also appears that the judge and 
the Commission looked to a medical panel to determine the 
applicant's employability but relied 6n only a portion of the 
panel's opinion. Further, neither the judge nor the Commission 
required or considered any proof of available employment in the 
marketplace for the applicant during the period they determined he 
was not permanently totally disabled. In fact, none of the 
parties to this matter contested the applicant's permanent total 
disability with any evidence at all. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The proceedings began in 1978 with ar^  application for hearing 
to determine the applicant's disability due to an industrial 
3 
accident on October 6, 1975, and the applicant's pre-existing 
impairment due to amputation of the distal phalanx of his right 
index finger. The applicant was referred to a medical panel, 
whose report found the applicant "totally disabled." The panel 
report was received in evidence without objection by the 
administrative law judge then assigned to the case. The judge 
found the applicant to be permanently and totally disabled, but 
awarded permanent partial impairment benefits and stated that the 
applicant "may be entitled to disability compensation from the 
Special Fund when benefits by the insurance carrier expire." The 
applicant filed a motion for review of the order, seeking a 
determination he be awarded permanent total benefits. The 
Commission denied the motion, stating it reserved the issue of 
permanent and total disability until such time as the permanent 
partial benefits were exhausted and deferring "consideration of 
this case to at least March 1, 1981." The Applicant then filed a 
Petition for Writ of Review with the Supreme Court. The 
Applicant's employer and it's insurer filed a Motion to Dismiss 
the Petition on the grounds the Order appealed from was not a 
final order. The Supreme Court granted the Motion to Dismiss. 
On June 28, 1985, the Applicant filed an Application for 
hearing seeking an award of benefits from the Second Injury Fund 
for permanent and total disability from October 6, 1981, the date 
on which his permanent partial benefits were exhausted. The 
Administrator of the Second Injury Fund advised the Administrative 
Law Judge that he waived the statutory requirements of Section 35-
4 
1-67, Utah Code Ann., as to mandatory r e f e r r a l to the d iv i s ion of 
v o c a t i o n a l r e h a b i l i t a t i o n and t h a t he s t i p u l a t e d t h a t the 
Applicant was permanently and t o t a l l y d i sab led . On November 18, 
1985, the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law judge thfen as s igned to the case 
e n t e r e d Findings of Fac t , Conclusions of Law, and Order finding 
the Applicant permanently and t o t a l l y disabled as a r e s u l t of h is 
i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t of October 5 , 197f>, and finding tha t "the 
f i r s t and only new evidence of a d e t e r i o r a t i o n in the Appl ican t ' s 
c o n d i t i o n w a r r a n t i n g such a f i n d i n g i s [a] l e t t e r from Dr. 
McNaught d a t e d J u l y 2 5 , 1 9 8 5 , " and o r d e r i n g compensa t ion 
commencing July 25, 1985. The Applicant f i l ed a Motion for Review 
of the order , object ing to the commencement date of the permanent 
t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y payments and a s s e r t i n g payments should be 
r e t r o a c t i v e to October 5 , 1981 , the c^ate on which permanent 
p a r t i a l impairment benef i t s were exhausted. The judge referred 
the i s s u e of commencement of permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y to a 
Med ica l Pane l on March 3 , 1986 and ^sked the P a n e l f s view 
r ega rd ing the a p p l i c a n t ' s employabi l i t jy . The Panels1 r epo r t , 
dated November 21 , 1986, did not fix a dat|:e on which the Applicant 
became permanent ly t o t a l l y d i sab led , but did s t a t e the Panel f s 
op in ion t h a t the Applicant "was not rendered unemployable as of 
October 1, 1981, or subsequent t h e r e t o , c^ n the bas is of physical 
impai rment . " The Panel s t a t e d , "Howevet, i n t ens i f i ed symptoms, 
the p a t i e n t ' s percep t ions of d i s a b i l i t y and a t t i t u d e s regarding 
re turn to work l i k e l y rendered him unemployable." 
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In an Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
dated February 2, 1987, the Judge found "no evidence compelling a 
change in the previously determined commencement date with respect 
to the Applicant's permanent total disability benefits." The 
Order further stated, 
If anything, the Medical Panel Report of Dr. 
Nord would provide a basis for postponing the 
commencement date, but as indicated earlier, 
the Administrative Law Judge has no intention 
of modifying the previous finding in this 
regard and hereby affirms the original finding 
that the applicant's permanent total 
disability commenced as of July 25, 1985. 
On June 2, 1987, Applicant filed a Motion for Review with the 
Industrial Commission. 
C. Disposition by The Industrial Commission 
The Industrial Commission's disposition of the motion for 
review was to review the record and deny the motion. The 
Commission issued an order denying motion for review on July 6, 
1987. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
There are two records containing the relevant facts in this 
matter. The first is Sharon L. Heaton vs. Boyles Brothers 
Drilling Company and Employers Mutual Insurance of Wausau, Supreme 
Court #16632, which was compiled in 1979 when the appellant herein 
sought review of the Industrial Commission's action deferring 
determination of permanent total disability until 1981. The first 
record will be referred to herein as "Rl." The second record, 
Sharon L. Heaton vs. Second Injury Fund, Court of Appeals 
6 
#870336-CA, contains the documents compiled since the closing of 
the first record for purposes of this appeal. The second record 
will be referred to herein as "R2." 
The applicant, Sharon L. Heaton, is a 51 year old male (Rl, 
p.45) who was injured in the course of his employment on October 
6, 1975 (Rl, p. 74.) At the time of hisl accident, Mr. Heaton was 
carrying 100-150 lbs. sacks of drilling mud in an area of his 
employer's mine where drilling mud was being mixed and the ground 
was slippery (Rl, pp. 1, 103, 124.)j He slipped and fell, 
immediately feeling pain in his neck, head, and back (Id.) He was 
the day, approximately 2 
hat day (Id.) He went to 
able to continue working the rest of 
hours, but did not return to work after tl 
the hospital in Payson, and was subsequently treated by Dr. John 
P. Mendenhall for severe cervical strain (Rl, p. 3.) Dr. 
Mendenhall referred Mr. Heaton to Dr. Lynn M. Gaufin in early 1976 
(Rl, pp. 7, 8.) Dr. Gaufin initially diagnosed thoracic outlet 
syndrome and observed degenerative joint changes at C4-5, 5-6 (Rl, 
p. 8.) Mr. Heaton intermittently underwent physical therapy and 
wore a cervical collar during 1976 and underwent an electromyogram 
October 11, 1976, which revealed a 
involving the seventh and eight cervical 
(Rl, p. 21.) He was admitted to Otahj 
cervical myelogram in November, 1976 (Rl, 
1976, he underwent an anterior disci 
decompression and fusion at C4-5 and C5-^ 
Heaton's pain did not resolve, and in 
cervical radiculopathy 
nerve roots bilaterally 
Valley Hospital for a 
p. 25.) On November 17, 
bctomy and nerve root 
p (Rl/ PP. 34-40.) Mr. 
August of 1977, he was 
referred to Dr. Mark Fullmer, who performed a left first rib 
resection for decompression of the brachioplexus (Rl, p. 46.) By 
March 20, 1978, Dr. Gaufin rated his patient as having a 20% full 
body permanent physical impairment and loss of physical function 
(Rl, pp. 53-54.) Dr. Eugene H. Chapman evaluated Mr. Heaton 
February 16, 1978, and found his condition progressive, his 
improvement nonexistent, and his ability to work inadequate to 
provide support (Rl, p. 56.) 
Mr. Heatonfs employer requested an independent medical 
examination in May, 1978. Mr. Heaton saw his employer's chosen 
examiner, Dr. Chester B. Powell, on June 20, 1978. Dr. Powell 
wrote of Mr. Heaton: 
At present, Mr. Heaton is totally disabled for 
any physical labor and probably would be 
unable to perform nonphysical sedentary work 
on the account of his chronic pain and 
cervical symptoms. There is nothing to 
suggest that the disability will diminish 
spontaneously in the future. 
• • • ' • ' . • ' • • 
At present Mr. Heaton is totally disabled and 
unless some medical basis for improving his 
disability is determined, this will probably 
go on as a permanent total disability. 
(Rl, pp. 65-70.) 
On June 27, 1978, Mr. Heaton applied for a hearing, seeking 
permanent total benefits (Rl, p. 74.) In March, 1979, a medical 
panel assigned by the administrative law judge involved in the 
case examined Mr. Heaton and found that "the applicant has been 
totally disabled since the injury on October 6, 1975" as well as 
concluding he was "67% disabled" with approximately 7% impairment 
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to be a t t r i b u t e d to a p r e - ex i s t i ng injury to his f inger (Rl, pp. 
103-105.) The adminis t ra t ive law judge accepted the f indings of 
the medical panel as h is ownf which f indings then became the law 
of the case , and wrote in h i s order : 
From t h e above r e p o r t and o t h e r medica l 
r e p o r t s on f i l e i t would appear t h a t the 
appl icant i s permanently and t o t a l l y disabled 
and i s e n t i t l e d to d i s a b i l i t y compensation as 
i n d i c a t e d in t h e Panel Report and may be 
e n t i t l e d to d i s a b i l i t y compensation from the 
Spec i a l Fund when b e n e f i t s by the insurance 
c a r r i e r exp i r e . A review of the case should 
be made a g a i n a t t h a t t i m i in c a s e t h e 
a p p l i c a n t s c o n d i t i o n has changed or t h a t 
f u t u r e s u r g e r y may h a v e r e s u l t e d i n 
improvement. 
(Rl, pp. 124-127.) 
The judge did not refer Mr. Heaton to the d iv i s ion of vocat ional 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n (Id-) Mr. Heaton moved for review of the judge 's 
d e c i s i o n , arguing he was e n t i t l e d to permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y 
b e n e f i t s (Rl , pp. 130-131.) The I n d u s t r i a l Commission reviewed 
the matter and concluded: 
[W]e a r e of t he opinion tha t Ithe Motion for 
Review should be denied. However, because of 
the c i r cums tances of t h i s c a s e , we are not 
i n c l i n e d t o c l o s e the i s s u e as being r e s 
purposes of future review. I t 
t o the Commission t h a t future 
a n t i c i p a t e d , and a l t h o u g h a 
not have been rendered a t t h i s 
w h e t h e r s u r g e r y w i l l be 
we b e l i e v e i t a p p r o p r i a t e to 
withhold a f ina l determinat ion pending a f ina l 
d e c i s i o n as to surgery and /o r I the completion 
of said surgery. . . . We wi l l therefore defer 
fur ther considera t ion of t h i s case to a t l e a s t 
March 1, 1981. After the date aforementioned, 
t h e a p p l i c a n t may a g a i n f i l e w i t h t h e 
Commission for a de te rmina t ion of permanent 
p a r t i a l o r p e r m a n e n t t o t a | l d i s a b i l i t y 
b e n e f i t s . (Rl, 141) 
j u d i c a t a for 
would appear 
s u r g e r y i s 
d e c i s i o n may 
t i m e a s t o 
u n d e r t a k e n , 
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Mr. Heaton then sought review from the Supreme Court (Rl, pp. 
146-151.) His employer moved to dismiss his petition for writ of 
review and the Court, on October 22, 1979, granted the motion "on 
the ground that the adjudication under attack does not appear to 
be a final order." (Rlf unnumbered page at beginning of volume.) 
Mr. Heaton continued to receive benefits from his employer 
and his attorney continued to question the inconclusive, 
contradictory nature of the decisions in his case through April of 
1980 (R2, pp. 1-31.) In March of 1985, Mr. Heaton sought further 
relief from the Industrial Commission (R2, p. 34) and on June 28, 
1985, applied for a hearing for the determination of permanent 
total disability (R2f pp. 42-46.) On August 7, 1985, he submitted 
to the Commission a medical report from Dr. Ross McNaught, dated 
July 25, 1985, which stated, in pertinent part: 
This 49 year old man states that he was 
injured in October of 1975 . . . Then he 
developed symptoms of cervical disc disease 
and approximately one year later had disc 
surgery . . . He has never completely 
recovered from the surgery and has been 
unable to work since that time. . . . He has 
continued to have symptoms both in the neck 
and upper extremities, but now in the lower 
extremities as well. He has had considerable 
deterioration in his complaints over the last 
two months and is now having difficulty 
getting out of bed, or in fact, ambulating. 
(R2, pp. 180, 181.) 
On November 18, 1985, an administrative law judge to whom the 
case had been reassigned, after the resignation of the initial 
judge, issued an order for Second Injury Fund benefits to begin as 
of July 25, 1985 (R2, pp. 63-69.) Mr. Heaton moved for a review 
of the order November 26, 1985. In January, 1986, the new 
10 
administrative law judge wrote a letter to Mr. Heaton's attorney, 
stating in part: 
jng the filef it 
n is not only 
I must concede that in reviewi 
does appear that Mr. Heatol 
permanently and totally disabled at this time 
but has been from the time of his industrial 
injury. (R2, p. 77.) 
The judge then referred the question of commencement date of 
benefits to a medical panel (R2, pp. 107-^110.) The panel reported 
on November 21, 1986 (R2, pp. 127-131.) On February 2, 1987, the 
judge entered his amended order declining to alter the 
commencement date from July 25, 1985 (Rl2, 139-144.) Mr. Heaton 
filed a motion for review of the amended order (R2, pp. 151-182.) 
The Industrial Commission denied the motion (R2, pp. 187-191.) 
Argument 
POINT I: PURSUANT TO § 35-l|-84, UTAH CODE 
ANN., THE COURT OF APPEALS MAY SET ASIDE AN 
AWARD OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ON THE 
GROUND THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT DO NOT 
SUPPORT THE AWARD AND MAY REVIEW THE EVIDENCE 
TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THERE WAS ANY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE FINDINGS; IN THIS 
CASE, THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS RELIED UPON AND THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT CANNOT, THE4EFORE, SUPPORT 
THE AWARD. 
Section 35-1-84, Utah Code Ann., provides that the reviewing 
court may set aside an award, or or^ler, of the Industrial 
Commission on the grounds that the commislsion acted without or in 
excess of its powers or that the finding^ of fact do not support 
the award. If the order is contrary to the evidence, the Court 
may set aside the order. Savage v. Industrial Comm.. 565 P.2d 782 
11 
(Utah 1977). In this case, the Commission stated in its 
order. 
Because t h e Commission f i n d s . . . t h e 
Administrat ive Law Judge c o r r e c t l y decided the 
d a t e b e n e f i t s were to begin based on the 
p r e p o n d e r a n c e of t h e c o m p e t e n t m e d i c a l 
e v i d e n c e , t h e Commission f i n d s t h a t t he 
a p p l i c a n t ' s Motion for r e t r o a c t i v e bene f i t s 
beginning in October 1981 should be denied. 
Order Denying Motion for Review, R2, p . 190 (emphasis added.) The 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law j u d g e , in t he o rde r which the Commission 
affirmed, s t a t e d : 
The commencement d a t e of t he a p p l i c a n t ' s 
permanent and t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y was based on 
the l e t t e r r epo r t of the same date from Dr. 
Ross McNaught, an orthopedic surgeon located 
in Cedar Ci ty , Utah. 
R2, p . 139. The r e p o r t of Dr, McNaught, dated July 25, 1985, 
contained the statement t ha t " i t i s my opinion t ha t h i s neurologic 
p i c t u r e i s d e t e r i o r a t i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y over the l a s t couple of 
months . . . " R2, p . 180. Dr. McNaught was t r e a t i n g physician 
for t he a p p l i c a n t . The preponderance of the medical evidence, 
however, i s r e f lec ted in the records of the appl icant re fer red to 
and quoted in the f a c t s above , and, in p a r t i c u l a r , in the two 
medical panel repor t s submitted in the case . The f i r s t r e p o r t , 
dated March 5, 1979, s t a t ed in pe r t i nen t p a r t : 
[T]he p a n e l f i n d s t h a t t h e a p p l i c a n t i s 
approximately 67% d i sab led . The panel would 
a t t r i b u t e 60% of h i s p e r m a n e n t p h y s i c a l 
impairment to the i n d u s t r i a l in jury occurring 
on O c t o b e r 6 , 1 9 7 5 . A p p r o x i m a t e l y 7% 
impairment would be a t t r i b u t e d to the injury 
t o h i s f i n g e r . The pane l f i n d s t h a t the 
appl icant has been t o t a l l y disabled s ince the 
in iurv on October 6. 1975. 
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R l , p . 105 (emphasis added.) The f i r s t report was adopted and 
permanent p a r t i a l benef i t s were awarded based upon i t . The order 
issued May 3, 1979f s t a t e d : 
From the above Report and thfe other medical 
r e p o r t s on f i l e i t would appear t h a t t he 
appl icant i s permanently and tjotally disabled 
and i s e n t i t l e d to d i s a b i l i t y bompensation as 
i n d i c a t e d in t h e Panel Report and may be 
e n t i t l e d to d i s a b i l i t y compensation from the 
Spec ia l Fund when b e n e f i t s by the insurance 
c a r r i e r exp i re . A review of the case should 
be made a g a i n a t t h a t t i m e in c a s e t h e 
a p p l i c a n t s c o n d i t i o n has changed or t h a t 
f u t u r e s u r g e r y may have r e s u l t e d i n an 
improvement. 
R l , p . 125 (emphasis added.) The second r epor t , of November 7, 
1986, s t a t ed i t s conclusions, pe r t inen t h£re , as follows: 
I n t e r m s of r e a s o n a 
p r o b a b i l i t y , responses to your) 
as follows: 
b l e m e d i c a l 
quest ions are 
1) There i s no s i g n i f i c a n t change in Mr. 
H e a t o n ' s pe rmanen t p h y s i c a l i m p a i r m e n t . 
Symptoms of dys func t ion a re r epo r t ed to be 
increased, while objec t ive changes in physical 
examination cannot be apprec ia ted . 
3) The a p p l i c a n t was 
u n e m p l o y a b l e as of O c t o b e r 
subsequent t h e r e t o , on the bas 
impairment . However, jntgpsjjf j<?d symptom? r 
the p a t i e n t f s p e r c e p t i o n s of 
no t r e n d e r e d 
If 1991i or 
lis of physical 
disability and 
attitudes regarding return t^> work likely 
rendered him unemployable. 
R2, pp. 130, 131 (emphasis added.) It therefore appears that the 
"competent medical evidence" does not Support the commencement 
date of July 25, 1985 for Fund benefits. The first panel found 
the applicant "totally disabled since the injury" and the second 
panel found "no significant change" in his physical impairment. 
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The p h y s i c i a n s who t r e a t e d t h e a p p l i c a n t never found him a b l e t o 
work and t h e i n d e p e n d e n t m e d i c a l e x a m i n e r c h o s e n by t h e 
a p p l i c a n t ' s employer t o e v a l u a t e him found him t o t a l l y d i s a b l e d i n 
1 9 7 8 ( R l , p p . 6 5 - 7 0 . ) The a p p l i c a n t ' s b e n e f i t s s h o u l d h a v e 
commenced, l o g i c a l l y and on a l l t h e medica l e v i d e n c e , i n October 
o f 1 9 8 1 when h i s p e r m a n e n t p a r t i a l b e n e f i t s from h i s employer 
c e a s e d . 
POINT I I : ONCE AN EMPLOYEE HAS PRESENTED 
EVIDENCE THAT HE CAN NO LONGER PERFORM HIS 
OCCUPATIONAL DUTIES AND HAS BEEN FOUND TOTALLY 
DISABLED, IT IS INAPPROPRIATE AND CONTRARY TO 
THE LAW TO REQUIRE HIM TO SHOW A DETERIORATION 
IN CONDITION FOR PERMANENT TOTAL BENEFITS. 
In t h e amended F i n d i n g s o f F a c t , C o n c l u s i o n s of Law, and 
O r d e r w h i c h t h e C o m m i s s i o n a d o p t e d a n d a f f i r m e d , t h e 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law judged s t a t e d , 
T h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e c o m p e l l i n g a change i n 
t h e p r e v i o u s l y d e t e r m i n e d commencement d a t e 
w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e a p p l i c a n t ' s t o t a l 
d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s . I f a n y t h i n g , t h e Medica l 
Panel Report of Dr. Nord would p r o v i d e a b a s i s 
f o r p o s t p o n i n g t h e commencement d a t e , but as 
i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r , t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law 
J u d g e h a s no i n t e n t i o n o f m o d i f y i n g t h e 
p r e v i o u s f i n d i n g i n t h i s r e g a r d and hereby 
a f f i r m s t h e o r i g i n a l f i n d i n g t h a t t h e 
a p p l i c a n t s p e r m a n e n t t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y 
commenced as of J u l y 2 5 , 1 9 8 5 . 
R 2 , p . 1 4 2 . The o r i g i n a l f i n d i n g was b a s e d on t h e l a c k o f 
e v i d e n c e o f a d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n t h e a p p l i c a n t ' s c o n d i t i o n o t h e r 
than t h e J u l y 25 l e t t e r of Dr. McNaught. Th i s i s e x p r e s s e d by t h e 
judge i n h i s i n i t i a l order i n t h e f o l l o w i n g words: 
The f i r s t a n d o n l y new e v i d e n c e o f a 
d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n t h e A p p l i c a n t ' s c o n d i t i o n 
w a r r a n t i n g such a f i n d i n g i s t h e l e t t e r from 
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Dr. McNaught da ted J u l y 25 , 31 
t i m e r the A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law »]Judge does not 
b e l i e v e the ev idence warrants! a f inding of 
pe rmanen t t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y p r i o r t o t h a t 
da t e , 1 
R2, p . 67. Requi r ing the a p p l i c a n t t o p r e s e n t evidence of a 
d e t e r i o r a t i o n i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e and c o n t r a r y to the law. The 
appl icant was found t o t a l l y disabled as a jresult of the October 6, 
1975 accident and t h i s condit ion was fourid to have s t a b i l i z e d as 
985. At this 
of March, 1978, (Rl, p. 105). The inij 
commencement of permanent total benefits 
benefits were paid out was based on the reasoning that, by surgery 
or other means, the applicants condition 
125.). The applicant has not worked sinie 1975 (R2 p. 169) and 
tial decision to defer 
until permanent partial 
might improve. (Rl, p. 
the second medical panel found no sign 
impairment and also found him unemployable. (R2, pp. 130, 131.) 
ificant change in his 
a situation, to provide 
In Marshall v. Indus. 
It is not the applicant's burden, in such 
evidence of deterioration of his condition 
Com'n of State of Utah, 681 P.2d 208 (fjtah 1984), the Supreme 
Court stated, 
Once the employee has presented 'evidence tha t 
he can no longer perform the du t i e s required 
i n h i s o c c u p a t i o n and t h a t he cannot be 
r e h a b i l i t a t e d , t h e b u r d e n s h i f t s t o the 
employer t o prove t h e exis tence of r egu la r , 
s t e a d y work t h a t t he employee can perform, 
taking in to account the employee's educat ion, 
mental capaci ty and age. 
681 P.2d a t 212. In Marshall , the Court aljso quoted from Brown v. 
Safeway StoreSr I n c . 82 N.M. 424, 483 P. 2d 305 (1970) , as 
follows: 
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It is much easier for the [employer] to prove 
the employability of the [employee] for a 
particular job than for the [employee] to try 
to prove the universal negative of not being 
employable at any work. Id. at 427, 483 P.2d 
305, 483 P.2d at 308. 
681 P.d at 213. To paraphrase the Brown logic, it is much easier 
to prove employability than it is to prove that one's condition 
has deteriorated from a state of total disability. To impose such 
a requirement is not only inappropriate, its fulfillment is 
logically and practically impossible. 
The Second Injury Fund stipulated that the applicant is 
permanently, totally disabled (R2, p. 50) and the second medical 
panel found no change in his condition. It appears that the date 
ordered for commencement of Fund benefits, based, as the 
administrative law judge stated, on Dr. McNaught's 1985 opinion 
applicant's condition was then deteriorating does not establish a 
preponderance of the medical evidence, but, rather is simply 
arbitrary and not related to the legal burdens of proof applicable 
to such a determination. (See "Odd-Lot" Doctrine in Point III 
below.) 
POINT III: THE ODD-LOT DOCTRINE PLACES THE 
BURDEN ON THE PARTY CONTESTING PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY TO SHOW THERE IS WORK AVAILABLE IN 
THE MARKETPLACE BEFORE BENEFITS CAN BE DENIED. 
As noted above, the Second Injury Fund stipulated to the 
permanent total condition of the applicant. As part of the 
stipulation, the Fund waived the requirement the applicant be 
referred to Rehabilitation Services. It thus appears that all 
those presently party to this matter agree that the applicant is 
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ye law judge which the 
tha t c e r t a in f indings of 
now unemployable . (See R2, p . 66.) lie has presented evidence 
t h a t he cou ld no longer perform the d u t i e s r e q u i r e d in h i s 
occupation as of 1975. By the Fund's waiver of r e h a b i l i t a t i o n , i t 
admits t ha t the appl icant cannot be r e h a b i l i t a t e d now, andr s ince 
there has been no change in his condi t ion , i t i s c lea r he could 
not be r e h a b i l i t a t e d over the years between 1975 and the p resen t . 
In t h e order of the a d m i n i s t r a t i j 
Commission affirmed, the judge implies 
the second medical panel argue for d a t i n g the commencement of 
benef i t s even beyond the l a t e date of July 25, 1985. The second 
medical panel found, in p a r t : 
An object ive evaluat ion of physical impairment 
i s q u i t e imposs ib le based upon the present 
examinat ion c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Fu r the rmore , I 
c a n n o t comprehend on what b k s i s the 1975 
[19791 medical panel members assigned a 60% 
pe rmanen t p ^ r t j a j . impairment r a t i n g frs _a 
c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y of 
October 6 , 1976. A d d i t i o n a l l y , the finger 
a m p u t a t i o n s h o u l d have b e e r i " r a t e d a t 5% 
permanent p a r t i a l impairment r 4n<3 not 7%, a j 
recommended. 
There i s no doubt t h a t i n j u r y to the neck 
occurred, and t ha t the ce rv ica l 
l e v e l s and l e f t f i r s t r i b r\ 
a c c o m p l i s h e d t o a l l e v i a t e s; 
degree of permanent p a r t i a l impairment would 
seem to be much l e s s than 60%. ^nd more l i k e l y 
in the range of 20-30%. 
fusion a t two 
^ s e c t i o n were 
mptoms. The 
R2, p. 130 (emphasis added). But the percent of impairment is not 
the determinative factor in issue in per 
Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 
manent total cases. In 
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1986) , the Commission denied permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y bene f i t s 
t o Hardman, adop t ing the f indings of a medical panel which had 
r a t e d Hardman ' s d i s a b i l i t y on physical impairment a lone , which 
impairment was minimal . 725 P.2d a t 1324, 1325. The Supreme 
Court, in reviewing the d e n i a l , pointed ou t . 
The Commission, by adopting the f indings of 
the medical panel as i t s own, fa i l ed to carry 
out i t s t a sk . I t appears to have confused the 
p e r c e n t a g e of impai rment , a d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
which the medical panel i s qua l i f i ed to make, 
wi th the percentage of d i s a b i l i t y , including 
f ^ c t Q t s j n a d d j t i Q n tQ t h e P h y s i c a l 
impairment, which i t i s the Commission's duty 
to determine. In workmen's compensation law, 
the d i s a b i l i t y i s the worker 's impairment of 
earning capac i ty . Northwest C a r r i e r s , Inc . v . 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah, 639 P.2d 138 
(Utah 1981). The Commission's f indings f a i l ed 
t o acknowledge the odd-lot doc t r ine accepted 
in most j u r i s d i c t i o n s and which has been 
r e p e a t e d l y approved by t h i s Cour t . That 
doc t r ine recognizes the s u b s t a n t i a l d i f ference 
between p h y s i c a l impairment and d i s a b i l i t y . 
For example, a low p e r c e n t a g e of p h y s i c a l 
i m p a i r m e n t i s not per se l e s s than t o t a l 
permanent d i s a b i l i t y . Numerous other cour ts 
a p p l y i n g t h e o d d - l o t d o c t r i n e have found 
p e r m a n e n t t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y d e s p i t e a 
d e c e p t i v e l y low p e r c e n t a g e of p h y s i c a l 
impairment. 
725 P.2d a t 1326 (emphasis added). In t h i s case , the fact t ha t 
the second medical pane l thought the a p p l i c a n t ' s percentage of 
i m p a i r m e n t was l e s s than the f i r s t panel c a l c u l a t e d has no 
b e a r i n g on the d a t e a t which the appl icant became e l i g i b l e for 
permanent t o t a l b e n e f i t s . Given the fact t h a t the second panel 
found no change in h is condi t ion , the lowered r a t i n g , a t worst , 
could only be taken as an implicat ion t h a t the r a t ing component of 
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the applicant's disability had consistently been "in the range 
of 20-30%." It was incumbent upon the 
consideration the other factors involved 
total disability, which were also cons 
shift the burden to any party contesting) 
prove that, as of October, 1981, there 
Commission to take into 
in determining permanent 
istently present, and to 
permanent disability to 
existed regular, steady 
work that the applicant could have performed. Marshall v. Indus, 
In viewing any offer of 
fls required to take into 
capacity, age, and prior 
Com'n of State of Utah, supra, at 212. 
proof of available work, the Commission 
account the applicant's education, mental 
training. Id. 
In this case, no evidence regarding tthe existence of regular, 
steady work was submitted. The Commission did not require any 
demonstration of availability of regular 
perform, either in 1985 or in 1981. The 
date appears to rest on the report from 
physician, and on the second medical pahel's lowered percentage 
rating, as well as on the panel's statement, "The applicant was 
not rendered unemployable as of October 
thereto, on the basis of physical impairment" (R2, p. 131), 
isolated criteria upon which Hardman, supra, and many other Utah 
work the applicant could 
commencement of benefits 
the applicant's treating 
Supreme Court decisions, have stated th4 decision for permanent 
total disability cannot be based. 
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POINT IV: IT IS NOT THE PROVINCE OF THE 
MEDICAL PANEL TO DETERMINE EMPLOYABILITY AND 
IT IS INAPPROPRIATE AND ARBITRARY FOR THE 
COMMISSION TO REST A DECISION AS TO 
EMPLOYABILITY ON SUCH DETERMINATION. 
As noted above, the second medical panel opined that the 
applicant was not rendered unemployable on the basis of physical 
impairment as of the date his permanent partial benefits were paid 
out. The panel went on to state that the applicant was 
unemployable on the basis of "intensified symptoms, the patient's 
perceptions of disability and attitudes regarding return to work." 
R2, p. 131. In the first place, the medical panel is qualified to 
determine percentage of impairment, but it is not qualified to 
determine percentage of disability which equates to 
unemployability. Determination of disability and unemployability 
remain the Commission's duty. Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet 
Management, supra. In this case, the Commission appears to have 
allowed the medical panel's opinion to determine that the 
applicant's benefits need not be retroactive to May 1, 1981, "or 
subsequent thereto". The Commission chose to disregard the 
portion of the opinion in which the panel found that some 
subjective factors other than physical impairment in fact produced 
the unemployability. Those factors (along with the age, education 
and work experience not discussed by the Commission or the second 
medical panel) have existed since the applicant's accident. The 
simple fact of the matter is that not just a part of the evidence 
but all of the evidence points to the Conclusion that the 
20 
applicant was an odd-lot unemployable individual continually from 
1975 to the present. 
POINT V: PURSUANT TO § 35-3J 
ANN., THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED 
-7 8, UTAH CODE 
TO 8% INTEREST 
ON HIS SECOND INJURY FUND BENEFITS. 
Section 35-1-78, Utah Code Ann., provides, in pertinent part, 
as follows: 
Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall 
include interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
from the date when each benefit payment would 
have otherwise become due and payable. 
As shown by all of the evidence in the record and the authorities 
cited herein, the date when the appellant 
have become due and payable is October 6,1 
fs benefit payments would 
1981. The appellant is 
entitled to the statutorily established interest on each payment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's order in this case is burdened by incidences 
of arbitrariness the weight of which must cause it to fall. There 
is no evidence in the record to support the finding of a July 25, 
19 85, commencement date for permanent total disability benefits. 
All of the doctors who evaluated the 
independent examiner chosen by the employer, the doctors on two 
medical panels, and the treating physician on whose report the 
administrative law judge claims to have 
that the appellant has been totally disabled since the time of his 
accident in 1975. The administrative law judge himself conceded 
the evidence showed permanent and total (disability from the time 
matter, including the 
based that date, agreed 
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of the industrial injury. To decide the commencement date should 
be anytime beyond the date permanent partial payments ceased can 
only be to decide arbitrarily and contrary to the overwhelming 
evidence. 
To place a burden of showing deterioration of condition on 
one who has been previously found permanently and totally disabled 
is, simply, illogical, but it is inappropriate as well. The 
appellant has not been able to work to support himself since his 
accident. So he states, and there is no evidence otherwise. 
Percentages and intensification of symptoms or questions of 
deterioration are not relevant to his case, as the odd-lot 
doctrine places the burden on whoever contests his permanent total 
disability to show there is employment in the marketplace which he 
can, in his condition, perform. 
Nor is the proof of employability to be left to a medical 
panel, even one which, as in this case, recognizes that factors 
other than physical impai rment must be calculated in a 
determination of disability. The early case Cardiff Corporation 
v. Hall, 1KB 1009 (1911), explained the placement of the burden: 
There are cases in which the burden of shewing 
suitable work can in fact be obtained does 
fall upon the employer . . . [I]f . . . the 
capacities for work left to him fit him only 
for special uses and do not . . . make his 
powers of labour a merchantable article in 
some well known lines of the labour market . . 
• it is incumbent upon the employer to shew 
that such special employment can in fact be 
obtained by him . . . . [I]f the accident 
leaves the workman's labour in the position of 
an "odd-lot" in the labour market, the 
employer must shew that a customer can be 
found who will take it . . . . 
22 
(Emphasis added.) In this case, of course, the employerfs burden 
falls on the appropriate defendant, the 
does not disappear or shift to the wo 
employer has fulfilled its responsibility! 
work, cannot work. His lot is poignantly described by Judge 
Cardozo in Jordan v. Decorative Co.. 130 N.E. 634 (N.Y. 1921) : 
Second Injury Fund. It 
|rker simply because the 
The appellant does not 
He was an unskilled or common laborer. He 
coupled his request for employment with notice 
that labor must be light. 
imposing such conditions is qui| 
for more versatile competitors. 
little patience with the suito 
favor. He is the 'odd-ldt' man, the 
nondescript in the labor market. Work if he 
gets it, is likely to bej 
intermittent . . . . Rebuff, 
The applicant 
ckly put aside 
Business has 
i: for ease and 
might reasonably be ascribed 
opportunities that await the 
halt. 
130 N.E. at 635, 636 (emphasis added.) 
casual and 
if suffered. 
to the narrow 
sick and the 
It was the opponent's 
burden to rebut, if it could, the appellant's permanent total 
disability with evidence of employability beyond the "narrow 
opportunities that await the sick and the halt." Not only has 
there been, in this case, a failure to meet the burden, the 
Commission failed to impose the burden or seek any evidence 
regarding it. 
The appellant's commencement date for permanent total 
benefits was not determined by application of the law or by 
reference to the facts in evidence. Th^ appellant respectfully 
requests the Court to reverse the Commission's decision and, on 
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the basis of the evidence on record and the authority outlined 
abovef order the Commission to recompute his benefits as of 
October 6, 1981. 
DATED this \b day of October, 1987. 
\c~ 2. James R.'Black 
A*-
Wendy M^seley 
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ADDENDUM 1: 
§ 3 5 - 1 - 6 7 U.C.A. 
WORKERSf COMPENSATION 35-1-84 
35-1-83- Review by Court of Appeals. 
Within 30 days after the commission has given notice of its award, pro-
vided a motion was previously filed in accordance with this act for review of 
the order or supplemental order upon which the award was based, any 
affected party, including the Division of Finance, may file an action in the 
Court of Appeals for review and| determination of the lawfulness of the 
award. , 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 87; C.L. 19H, 
§ 3148; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 19^ *3, 
42-1-77; L. 1941 (1st S.S.), ch. 15, § 1; C. 
1943, 42-1-77; L. 1965, ch. 67, § 1; 1977, cli. 
156, § 10; 1986, ch. 47, § 17. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment rewrote the section. 
Meaning of "this act". — The phrkse 
"this act" appearing in this section appar-
ently refers to this chapter. 
Standard of review. 
In reviewing interpretations of generfal 
questions of law, appellate court applies 
correction-of-error standard, with no defer-
35-1-84. Furnishing and 
transcript, etc. 
ence to the expertise of the commission. 
Board of Education of Alpine School Dist. v. 
Olsen (1984) 684 P 2d 49. 
Administrative determination that indi-
vidual was an employee for workers' compen-
sation purposes, while entitled to some defer-
ence, was subject to judicial review to assure 
that it fell within the limits of reasonable-
ness or rationality; thus, appellate court con-
fined its review to a determination of 
whether the facts supported the conclusion of 
law or whether the decision was contrary to 
the evident purpose of the statute. Board of 
Education of Alpine School Dist. v. Olsen 
(1984) 684 P 2d 49. 
certifying proceedings and 
ANALYSIS 
Arbitrary and capricious. 
Review of findings. 
Arbitrary and capricious. 
The standards for reversal in subsectiohs 
(1) and (2) require that in order for a court to 
set aside the commission's findings, it must 
be shown that the findings are arbitrary and 
capricious. Blaine v. Industrial Comm'n pf 
Utah (Utah 1985) 700 P 2d 1084. 
Review of findings. 
The supreme court will not interfere wiih 
the orders of the industrial commission 
unless the orders are contrary to the evidence 
or contrary to the law. Savage v. Industrial 
Comm. (1977) 565 P 2d 782. 
The commission's findings should be dis-
placed on review by supreme court only if 
they are arbitrary or capricious, or wholly 
without cause, or contrary to the one inevita-
ble conclusion from the evidence, or without 
any substantial evidence to support them. 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi (1981) 631 P 
2d 888. 
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ADDENDUM 2: 
§ 3 5 - 1 - 6 7 U . C . A . 
35-1-67 LABOR-INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
disability — Amount of pay-
Vocational rehabilitation — Proce-
35-1-67. Permanent total 
ments -
dure and payments 
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 662k% of 
his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a 
maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a 
dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 
18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed 
the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not 
to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week. However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier be required to pay weekly compensation 
payments for more than 312 weeks A finding by the commission of perma-
nent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until such 
time as the following proceedings have been had: If the employee has tenta-
tively been found to be permanently and totally disabled, it shall be manda-
tory that the industrial commission of Utah refer the employee to the divi-
sion of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education for 
rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of the commission to order 
paid to the vocational rehabilitation division, out of the second injury fund 
provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $1,000 for use in the 
rehabilitation and training of the employee; the rehabilitation and training 
of the employee shall generally follow the practice applicable under 
§ 35-1-69, relating to the rehabilitation of employees having combined in-
juries. If the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of 
education certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing that the 
employee has fully cooperated with the division of vocational rehabilitation 
in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the 
employee may not be rehabilitated, the commission shall order that there 
be paid to the employee weekly benefits at the rate of 662/3% of his average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week 
and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent 
spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week out 
of the second injury fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for such 
period of time beginning with the time that the payments, as in this section 
provided, to be made by the employed or its insurance carrier terminate and 
ending with the death of the employee. No employee shall be entitled to 
any such benefits if he fails or refuses to cooperate with the division of 
vocational rehabilitation under this sbction. 
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All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to 
benefits from the second injury fund under Subsection 35-1-68 (1), includ-
ing those injured prior to March 6, 1949, shall receive not less than $120 
per week when paid only by the second injury fund, or when combined with 
compensation payments of the employer or the insurance carrier. The divi-
sion of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the vocational 
training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the 
work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission 
shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be heard, deter-
mine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sus-
tained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both 
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, consti-
tutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the 
provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total disa-
bility is required in those instances. In all other cases where there has been 
rehabilitation effected but where there is some loss of bodily function, the 
award shall be based upon partial permanent disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in 
§§ 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess of 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for 
312 weeks. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 78; C.L. 1917, ment) and near the end of the fourth para-
S 3139; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933, graph (deleted by the 1977 amendment); and 
42-1-63; L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, ch. 51, substituted "July 1, 1975" for "July 1, 1974" 
§ 1; C. 1943, 42-1-63; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; in the fourth paragraph (deleted by the 1977 
1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. amendment). 
57, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; The 1977 amendment by chapter 151 sub-
1961, ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. stituted "spouse" for "wife" in the first para-
68, § 1; 1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 5; graph. 
1971, ch. 76, § 6; 1973, ch. 67, § 4; 1974, ch. The 1977 amendment by chapter 156 made 
13, § 1; 1975, ch. 101, § 5; 1977, ch. 150, the same changes as the 1977 amendment by 
§ 1; 1977, ch. 151, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, § 6; chapter 151; combined the first two para-
1979, ch. 138, § 2; 1981, ch. 286, § 1; 1983, graphs into one paragraph; inserted the see-
ch. 356, § 1; 1985, ch. 160, § 1. ond paragraph; and deleted the former third 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1975 amend- and fourth paragraphs which read: "Com-
ment substituted "85% of the state average mencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are 
weekly wage" for "662/3% of the state average permanently and totally disabled and on tha1 
weekly wage" four times in the first para- date or prior thereto were receiving compen 
graph and once in the last paragraph; in- sation benefits from the special fund providec 
creased the minimum benefit per week from for by section 35-1-68(1) shall be paid com 
$35 to $45 in the first paragraph; inserted pensation benefits at the rate of $60 pe 
"not to exceed the average weekly wage of week. 
the employee at the time of the injury" twice "Commencing July 1,1975, all persons wh 
in the first paragraph; increased the benefit were permanently and totally disabled on c 
per week from $50 to $60 at the end of the before March 5, 1949, and were receivin 
third paragraph (deleted by the 1977 amend- compensation benefits and continue to r( 
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The thirty-day limitation prescribed by 
R. S. 1933, § 42-1-77, was imposed without 
respect to the nature of the insurance car-
rier; that is, as to whether compensation 
was assured by an insurance company, the 
state insurance fund, or the employer a 
a self-insurer. In fact it applied to al 
who came within the terms of the Wort 
men's Compensation Act. Woldberg v. Iu 
dustrial Comm., 74 U. 309, 279 P. 609. 
35-1-84, Furnishing and certifying proceedings and transcript to Su 
preme Court—Power of court to affirm or set aside award—Grounds fo: 
setting aside.—Upon the filing of the action for review the court shal 
direct the commission to furnish and certify to the Supreme Court, withii 
twenty days, all proceedings and the transcript of evidence taken in tin 
case, and the matter shall be determined upon the record of the commissioi 
as certified by it. Upon such review the court may affirm or set aside sue! 
award, but only upon the following grounds: 
(1) That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers; 
(2) That the findings of ^act do not support the award. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, §87; 0. L. terfered with by Supreme Court, whei 
1917, § 3148; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R^  S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 42-1-78; L. 1965, ch. 67, §1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1965 amendment rewrote this sec-
tion which read: "Such writ shall be made 
returnable not later than thirty days after 
the date of the issuance thereof, and shall 
direct the commission to certify its record, 
which shall include all the proceedings 
and the evidence taken in the case, to the 
court. On the return day the cause shall be 
heard unless for good cause the same is 
continued. No new or additional evidence 
may be introduced in such court, but the 
cause shall be heard on the record of the 
commission as certified by it. Th^ review 
shall not be extended further than to de-
termine: 
"(1) Whether or not the commission 
acted without or in excess of its powers. 
"(2) If findings of fact ar£ made, 
whether or not such findings of fact sup-
port the award under review." 
Cause of death. 
Findings of commission as to cause of 
death, where evidence is conflicting, will 
not be disturbed. Parker v. Industrial 
Comm., 78 U. 509, 5 P. 2d 573. 
Findings of commission, supported by 
substantial, competent evidence, that 
county jailor died from coronary embolism 
of the heart, and that his death was not 
caused or contributed to by fall and in-
jury which he sustained at the county 
jail, will not be disturbed. Reynolds v. 
Industrial Comm., 88 U. 186, 27 if. 2d 28, 
affd. 88 U. 192, 53 P. 2d 81. 
Dependency. 
Issue of dependency being one of fact, 
industrial commission's conclusions are 
like verdict of jury and will not; be in-
supported by some substantial evidence 
McVicar v. Industrial Comm., 56 U. 342 
191 P. 1089. 
Dependency and extent thereof are quea 
tions of fact to be determined primarily 
by industrial commission; and this sectioi 
confines Supreme Court's power of reviev 
of commission's award to determinatioi 
whether commission acted without or ii 
excess of its powers and whether finding: 
of fact, if made, support award. Com 
bined Metals Eeduction Co. v. Industria 
Comm., 74 U. 247, 278 P. 1019; Rolle: 
Coaster Co. v. Industrial Comm., 112 U 
532, 189 P. 2d 709. 
This section has been applied to finding! 
of commission as to dependency. Rigby v 
Industrial Comm., 75 U. 454, 286 P. 628 
Where commission found applicant wai 
never legally married to deceased and was 
living with him as his common-law wife 
findings were sufficient to support ordei 
denying compensation, although commis 
sion relied upon finding that deceased wai 
engaged in interstate commerce to suppori 
the order. Schurler v. Industrial Comm. 
86 U. 284, 43 P. 2d 696, 100 A. L. R. 1085 
Extent of injury. 
In proceeding by employee for addition 
al compensation, whether disability fron 
which applicant was suffering at time oi 
application arose from accident or fron 
old hernia of long standing was questior 
as to extent of injury which industria 
commission had power to determine with 
out review. Littsos v. Industrial Comm. 
57 U. 259, 194 P. 338. 
Finding that employee's insanity was 
caused by injury in course of employmenl 
was supported by sufficient competent evi 
dence. Ogden Union Railway & Depot Co 
v. Industrial Comm., 85 U. 124, 38 P. 2c 
766. 
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Function of medical panel. 
It is the function of the medical panel to 
give the commission the benefit of its diagno-
sis relating to those matters within its exper-
tise, and not to infringe upon commissions 
responsibility to decide the issues in a work-
men's compensation case. IGA Food Fair v. 
Martin (1978) 584 P 2d 828. 
Mandatory referral to panel. 
This section is mandatory in its require-
ment that a medical panel shall be convened 
upon the filing of a claim for compensation 
for injury by accident, or for death, arising 
out of or in the course of employment when 
the employer or insurance carrier denies lia-
bility. Lipman v. Industrial Comm. (197y) 
592 P 2d 616. 
The provision requiring the submission of 
the medical aspects of the case, including 
those involving causation, to a medical panel 
is mandatory. Schmidt v. Industrial Comm. 
ofUtah(1980)617P2d693. 
Panel report as evidence. | 
Although all other evidence and testimony 
indicated that the plaintiff was totally dis-
abled, report of the medical panel that plain-
tiff had suffered a 50% permanent partial dis-
ability is sufficient to support finding of in-
dustrial commission of a partial disability. 
Shipley v. C & W Contracting Co. (1974) 528 
P 2d 153. 
It is the duty of the commission to consider 
not only the medical panel report, but also all 
of the other evidence, and to draw whatever 
inferences and deductions that can be fairly 
and reasonably derived therefrom in reach-
ing a decision on the issues. IGA Food Fair v. 
Martin (1978) 584 P 2d 828. 
Although medical panel report did not link 
employee's heart attack with the stress he 
had experienced four days earlier at his job, 
the commission's finding that there was a 
causal connection between the stress and the 
subsequent heart attack was neither arbi-
trary nor capricious and not without any sub-
stantial evidence to support it where a cardi-
ologist testified that there was in fact a 
causal link between the stress and the heart 
attack. Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Kel-
ler (1983) 657 P 2d 1367. 
Qualifications of panel members. 
Statutory requirement that medical panel 
member specialize in "treatment of the dis-
ease" was met where practice consisted of 
representing businesses and teaching, even 
though physician did not actually treat pa-
tients on an appointment basis. Edwards v. 
Tillery(1983)671P2dl95. 
Referral to panel. 
— Discretion. 
As the evidence of the causal connection 
between an employee lifting a very heavy 
beam and the perforation of his ulcer was not 
uncertain or highly technical, the failure to 
refer the case to a medical panel was not an 
abuse of discretion. Champion Home Bldrs. v. 
Industrial Comm'n (Utah 1985) 703 P 2d 306. 
35-1-78, Continuing jurisdiction of commission to mod-
ify award — Authority to destroy records — 
Interest on awar^. 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be 
continuing, and it may from time to time make such modification or change 
with respect to former findings, or orders with respect thereto, as in its 
opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to 
cases, other than those of total permanent disability or where a claim has 
been filed as in 35-1-99, which have been closed and inactive for a period of 
10 years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the 
rate of 8% per annum from the date when each benefit payment would have 
otherwise become due and payable. 
87 
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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OjF UTAH 
Case No: B85000588 
SHARON L. HEATON, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
BOYLE BROTHERS DRILLING and/or 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
ORDER DENYING 
tOTION FOR REVIEW 
On November 18, 1985, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofj Law and Order awarding the 
applicant in the above-captioned case permanent tbtal disability benefits to 
begin retroactively as of July 25, 1985. The Administrative Law Judge chose 
the date of July 25, 1985 as the beginning date o^ permanent total disability 
as on that date Dr. R. McNaught issued the first medical report in evidence 
indicating the applicant was permanently totally disabled. On November 27, 
1985, the counsel for the applicant filed a Motion for Review contesting the 
July 25, 1985 date as the beginning date of permanent total disability. The 
counsel for the applicant argued that the benefits should have been awarded 
beginning in 1981 when the permanent partial impairment benefits awarded 
earlier were completed. An extensive Brief in support of this Motion for 
Review was later filed on February 3, 1986. In ^hat Brief, the counsel for 
the applicant contests the Administrative Law 
prolonged litigation by encouraging a Stipulated 
Injury Fund (the only party/defendant as the 
obligation under the law). Even though the attdrney for the applicant had 
failed to present supportive medical evidence as required of all applicants, 
the counsel for the applicant indicates a hearing should have been scheduled 
(in fact a hearing had been scheduled but the attorney for the applicant did 
Judge's attempts to avoid 
Agreement from the Second 
(farrier had paid its full 
not get the hearing notice until after the Brief 
Commission). 
was sent to the Industrial 
In an attempt to resolve the issues raised in the Motion for Review, 
a pre-hearing conference was scheduled where the parties agreed to referring 
the unresolved issues to a medical panel for decision. Those issues included 
1) medical expenses, 2) retroactive permanent total disability benefits from 
1981 until July 25, 1985, 3) porportionate liability on the initial 312 weeks 
of permanent total disability between the carrier and the Second Injury Fund. 
In order to ensure the applicant was not prejudiced by the additional delay, 
the Commission issued a Partial Granting of Motion for Review directing the 
Second Injury Fund to pay the applicant the accrued, permanent total disability 
benefits from July 25, 1985 on and to continue the lifetime benefits during 
the time it took to receive a Medical Panel Report on the remaining issues. 
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The Medical Panel Report was received on November 20, 1986. The 
report indicates the applicant was not permanently totally disabled from 
October 1981 until July 25, 1985. Also, the report states that medications 
necessary in the future should be limited to muscle relaxants and analgesics. 
The panel found the impairment the applicant suffered was 20 to 30% due to the 
1975 industrial injury with a 5% pre-existing condition. On February 2, 1987, 
the Administrative Law Judge issued Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order which, along with the second Amended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order issued on February 13, 1987, adopted the medical 
panel findings and awarded benefits consistent therewith. As result of the 
adoption of the medical panel findings, no retroactive award of permanent 
total disability benefits from 1981 to July 25, 1985 was allowed and the 
permanent total disability award remained as earlier awarded, beginning July 
25, 1985. Reimbursement on medical expenses due the carrier out of the Second 
Injury Fund was found to 16-2/3% per the panel's impairment ratings. 
On February 11, 1987, the counsel for the applicant sent a letter to 
the Administrative Law Judge indicating he was considering possibly filing a 
Motion for Review but needed to first consult with the applicant. Counsel for 
the applicant represented in that letter that he hoped to be able to file the 
Motion for Review by late March 1987. The Administrative Law Judge did not 
respond to the counsel for the applicant's letter indicating an allowance of 
additional time to file the Motion for Review (which per statute is due within 
fifteen (15) days of the date of the Order making the due date approximately 
February 20, 1987). Counsel for the applicant did not file a Motion for 
Review by late March 1987 and as result the matter was considered final. 
On June 2, 1987, the Commission received a Motion for Review filed by 
the counsel for the applicant. The Motion for Review is nearly 4 months late 
and no extension of time to file the Motion was ever allowed by the 
Administrative Law Judge or the Commission. The Commission could deny the 
Motion for Review simply based on the lateness of the filing. Because the 
Commission is reluctant to base a Denial on a procedural problem, the 
Commission will address the points raised by the counsel for the applicant. 
The main issue raised in the Motion for Review is the start date for the 
permanent total disability benefits. Counsel for the applicant continues to 
maintain that the benefits should as of October 1981. Addressing the itemized 
points in the Motion for Review, the counsel for the applicant first maintains 
that the first medical panel (in 1979) found the applicant was totally 
disabled since the date of injury. The Commission finds the medical panel at 
that time was unclear whether it believed the applicant was permanently 
totally disabled or merely partially impaired, but the Administrative Law 
Judge at that time, now the applicant's counsel, did not award permanent total 
disability benefits. Consequently, the Commission cannot see how counsel for 
the applicant can argue that the prior medical panel's inconclusive finding 
argues for permanent total disability beginning in 1979 when at that time 
counsel for the applicant himself determined permanent total disability 
benefits were not warranted. 
SHAJROM L. HEATOM 
ORDER DENYIMG MOTION FOR REVIEW 
PAGE THREE 
Counsel for the applicant next argues the first Order dated May 3, 
1979 found the applicant to be permanently totally disabled. As just pointed 
out, the Administrative Law Judge at that time (the counsel for the applicant) 
did not award permanent total disability benefits in that Order so once again 
the Commission finds this argument is contradictory and non-supportive of an 
earlier beginning date for permanent total disability benefits. Counsel for 
the applicant points to a doctor report from January 1984 which notes the 
applicant had a verifiable disability at that tirde. The Commission finds that 
the doctor report does not establish the applicant was permanently totally 
disabled at that time. Counsel for the applicant points to the applicant's 
June 25, 1985 Affidavit stating that the applicant felt his condition 
continued to worsen. The Commission notes that the Affidavit is dated just 
one month prior to when benefits were begun and once again does not establish 
that permanent total disability benefits properly were payable in 1981. 
Counsel for the applicant notes that the Administrative Law Judge 
stated in a letter that the applicant appeared to have been permanently 
totally disabled since the date of injury. This was a pre-medical panel 
comment, not a finding, and the Commission finds the Administrative Law Judge 
obviously changed his opinion when the medical panel found otherwise. Counsel 
for the applicant notes that the most recent medical panel found no 
significant change in the applicant's permanent partial impairment. The 
Commission finds the permanent partial impairment rating is not criteria used 
in determining when permanent total disability should begin. Counsel for the 
applicant argues the Second Injury Fund either agreed to begin payments in 
1981 or should be required to pay beginning that date because the Second 
Injury Fund stipulated to permanent total disability and did not file an 
Objection to the applicant's claim benefits should begin in 1981. The 
Commission finds the Second Injury Fund never stipulated or agreed to a 1981 
beginning for the permanent total disability benefits. The Second Injury Fund 
stipulated to the fact that the applicant was permanently totally disabled as 
of 1985 and the file reflects that as of October 1985, the Administrator of 
the Second Injury Fund had discussed the issue of a beginning date with 
counsel for the applicant and had determined no agreement could be reached and 
thus decided the Administrative Law Judge needed to resolve that issue. The 
Commission finds the counsel for the applicant*^ arguments that the Second 
Injury Fund needs to pay accrued benefits in a lump sum is correct and the 
Commission already awarded lump sum accrued benefits in its Order Partially 
Granting Motion for Review. The Commission not^ es that only those accrued 
benefits found due and owing need to be paid in a lump sum. Finally, the 
Commission does not agree that the Administrative Law Judge must view all 
evidence submitted in a light most favorable to the injured employee. The 
Administrative Law Judge must rule based on the preponderance of the evidence, 
with the burden of proof on the applicant, and should interpret the statute, 
where it is unclear, in a manner that is consistent with humanitarian purpose 
of the Act. 
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Because the Commission finds the applicant's itemized arguments are 
not supporbive of a finding that permanent total disability existed in 1981, 
and because the Commission finds the Administrative Law Judge correctly 
decided the date benefits were to begin based on the preponderance of the 
competent medical evidence, the Commission finds that the applicant's Motion 
for retroactive benefits beginning in October 1981 should be denied. The 
Counsel for the applicant also claims the defendant/insurance carrier should 
pay medical costs of $1,761.99 which the applicant claimed earlier in a letter 
to the Administrative Law Judge. The defendant/insurance carrier filed a 
response to the applicant's Motion for Review on June 23, 1987 indicting that 
no verification that the expenses were related to the October 6, 1975 accident 
was submitted along with the claim for reimbursement. The Commission finds 
that the defendant/carrier is not required to pay the claimed reimbursement 
until the applicant provides verification of relatedness to the 
defendant/carrier. Having addressed all of the counsel for applicant's 
arguments and having found those arguments non-supportive of the relief sought 
by the counsel for the applicant, the Commission finds the applicant's Motion 
for Review should be denied and the Administrative Law Judge's Order should be 
affirmed. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's June 2, 1987 Motion 
for Review is hereby denied and the Administrative Law Judge's February 2, 
1987 Amended Order and the February 13, 1987 second Amended Order are hereby 
affirmed and final. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Ut^h, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
^gj^'day of July, 1987. 
ATTEST: 
Len\pe L. Nielsen 
Commissioner 
Johri/Florez 
Commissioner 
J 
Commiss^ron Sppppbrv 
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400 East Riverside, Apt 513 
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Robert. W. Brandt 
Attorney at Law 
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Wausau Insurance 
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ADDENDUM 6: 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER, 
FEBRUARY 2, 1997 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CASE No. B85000588 
* 
SHARON L. HEATON, * 
Applicant, * 
vs. * 
* 
BOYLE BROTHERS DRILLING? and * 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY * 
* 
* 
Defendants, * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant was injured in an industrial accident on October 6, 
1975. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were entered in this 
matter on November 18, 1985. This was a follow-up to the original Order dated 
May 3, 1979, entered by Keith E. Sohm, who was then an Administrative Law 
Judge for the Industrial Commission of Utah and is now representing the 
applicant as his attorney. The Order of November 18, 1985, was based upon a 
Stipulation by the Administrator of the Second Injury Fund that the applicant 
was permanently and totally disabled. The Stipulation included a waiver by 
the Administrator of the Second Injury Fund of the statutory requirement in 
Section 35-1-67 that all determinations of permanent total disability be 
tentative until such time as Rehabilitation Services certified the applicant 
was not a candidate for rehabilitation. The Stipulation by the Administrator 
of the Second Injury Fund enabled the Administrative Law Judge to avoid the 
necessity of a prior hearing and expedite the payment of benefits to the 
applicant. The applicant was found to be permanently and totally disabled as 
of July 25, 1985, and was awarded lifetime benefits of $131.75 per week, 
commencing July 25, 1985, with accrued amounts being payable in a lump sum. 
The commencement date of the applicants permanent and total disability was 
based on the letter report of the same date from Dr. Ross McNaught, an 
orthopedic surgeon located in Cedar City, Utah. 
The Findings of Fact set forth in the Order of November 18, 1985, are 
incorporated herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
ONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
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Payment of benefits to the applicant were delayed somewhat because 
the applicant filed a Motion for Review of the Order, in which he objected to 
the commencement date of permanent total disability and the omission of a 
directive regarding unpaid medical bills. The filing of the Motion for Review 
prevented the Order of November 18, 1985, from becoming a final Order and the 
Administrator of the Second Injury Fund refused to commence payments until the 
Order was final. Because the Motion for Review did not go to the 
determination of permanent total disability, but only to the commencement date 
thereof, the Administrative Law Judge urged upon the Industrial Commission to 
enter an Order requiring the benefits as ordered be paid forthwith, but that 
all other issues would be reserved for determination after the completion of a 
medical paneL evaluation and the entering of a final Order. A medical panel 
evaluation had been previously stipulated to by all parties as a means of 
addressing those issues which were still controverted. It had been agreed by 
the parties that Dr. Nathaniel M. Nord would be asked to perform an impartial 
evaluation (medical panel evaluation) of the unresolved medical aspects of the 
applicant's claim. This appointment was made on March 3, 1986. Dr. Nord's 
evaluation was delayed because of the press of other matters, but his report 
was eventually submitted under date of November 7, 1986, and copies thereof 
were mailed to all parties on November 21, 1986. The applicant raised 
objections to the Medical Panel Report, but a request was made that "the Judge 
honor the previous finding of permanent total disability. If there is an 
intent to change that finding, we respectfully request a hearing on the 
Medical Panel Report with Dr. Nord present." It is the writer* s intent to 
honor the previous finding of permanent total disability so no hearing on the 
Medical Panel Report is deemed necessary and the report is received in 
evidence. 
The letter from Mr. Sohm, dated December 16, 1986, refers the 
Administrative Law Judge to "the report of previous medical panel provided by 
the Dean and Old Master of Panels, Dr. Hess, and his finding of 6 7% impairment 
. . ." The reference to the finding of impairment by the former medical panel 
is correct, but Dr. Hess was not the chairman, nor a member of that panel. 
That panel was comprised of Dr. John R. Ream, as chairman, and Dr. Edward A. 
Heyes and Dr. Marion Walker, as members of the panel. It should be noted that 
while the Administrative Law Judge has great respect for each of the members 
of the former medical panel, they have had only limited experience in serving 
on medical panels appointed by the Industrial Commission, whereas Dr. Nord has 
had extensive experience in serving on Industrial Commission medical panels 
and is highly respected for his competency and impartiality in rendering 
advisory opinions to the Industrial Commission. This is not to imply that Dr. 
Nord's competency as a physician is any greater than the competency of the 
members of the medical panel, but is only to suggest that he has had much more 
experience in providing impairment ratings than have any of the members of the 
medical panel and his expertise in that regard is highly respected. It should 
be noted that doctors do not receive training on how to rate permanent 
impairment as part of their medical curriculum. This is a skill that they 
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must necessarily acquire through years of experience and reliance on various 
guidelines that have been published, such as the American Medical 
Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment and the Manual 
for Orthopaedic Surgeons in Evaluating Permanent Physical Impairment, 
published by the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons. The Guidelines are 
no substitute for experience, but they do assist the physicians in developing 
a more uniform and consistent approach to the rating process, on which the 
Industrial Commission must necessarily rely. It is for the foregoing reasons 
that the Administrative Law Judge adopts the finding of Dr. Nord as his own, 
relative to the applicant's impairment and finds as follows: 
"An objective evaluation of physical impairment is quite 
impossible based upon the present examination circum-
stances. Furthermore, I cannot comprehend on what basis 
the 1975 [1979] medical panel members assigned a 60% 
permanent partial impairment rating as a consequence of the 
industrial injury of October 6, 1976. Additionally, the 
finger amputation should have been rated at 5% permanent 
partial impairment, and not 7%, as recommended. 
There is no doubt that injury to the neck occurred, and 
that the cervical fusion at two levels and left first rib 
resection were accomplished to alleviate symptoms. The 
degree of permanent partial impairment would seem to be 
much less than 60%, and more likely ia the range of 20-30%." 
The Administrative Law Judge also adopts the following findings of 
Dr. Nord and finds: 
1. There is no significant change in Mr. Heaton's perm-
anent physical impairment. Symptoms of dysfunction 
are reported to be increased, while objective changes 
in physical examination cannot be appreciated. 
2. No determination (of a change in Mr. Heaton's 
condition after October 1, 1981), is possible except 
as noted above. 
3. The applicant was not rendered unemployable as of 
October 1, 1981, or subsequent thereto, on the basis 
of physical impairment. However, intensified 
symptoms, the patient*s perceptions of disability and 
attitudes regarding return to work likely rendered him 
unemployable. 
4. The treatment rendered by Dr. Roberts is related to 
the October 6, 1975, accident. 
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5. The use of analgesics and muscle relaxant medications 
are related to the October 6, 1975, accident. 
6. Future treatment necessitated by Mr. Heaton's 
accidents would be limited to medications only. 
There is no evidence compelling a change in the previously determined 
commencement date with respect to the applicant's permanent total disability 
benefits. If anything, the Medical Panel Report of Dr, Nord would provide a 
basis for postponing the commencement date, but as indicated earlier, the 
Administrative Law Judge has no intention of modifying the previous finding in 
this regard and hereby affirms the original finding that the applicant's 
permanent total disability commenced as of July 25, 1985. 
The Administrative Law Judge makes no finding with respect to 
attorneys' fees. Such determination will be referred to the Commission en 
banc. The previous award of $395.25 based on accrued benefits is 
appropriate. Any consideration for payment of fees out of future awards 
should be made by the Commission. This determination will be facilitated by 
the submission of a petition by applicant's counsel and by a letter from the 
applicant setting forth his opinion as to what he would consider to be a 
reasonable award out of future benefits. If approved, the Commission should 
determine the method of payment, i.e., direct payment by the applicant out of 
benefits received, lump sum payment with corresponding reduction of benefits, 
or periodic payments with corresponding reduction of benefits. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant is entitled to permanent total disability benefits, as 
a result of his industrial accident of October 6, 2975, in accordance with the 
foregoing Findings of Fact. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant remain on the Second 
Injury Fund payroll effective July 25, 1985 He should continue to receive 
payments from the State Treasurer, as custodian of the Second Injury Fund, 
permanent total disability at the rate of $131.75 per week for as long as he 
shall live. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Keith E. Sohm, attorney for the applicant, 
be paid the sum of $395.25, as previously ordered for services rendered in 
this proceeding with any additional claim for attprney fees being determined 
by the commission sitting en banc. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Boyle Brothers Drilling 
Company and/or Wausau Insurance Company, pay all medical expenses incurred by 
the applicant as a result of his industrial accident of October 6, 1975; these 
expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule 
of this Commission. These expenses shall include the services rendered by Dr. 
Howard L. Roberts and the prescriptions given by him. Also, the services 
rendered by Dr. D. Ross McNaught, and the cost of other medications that have 
been, or will be, prescribed in treatment of injuries resulting from the 
applicant's industrial accident. The applicant shall be responsible for 
promptly submitting to the defendants a copy of all expenses for which he 
claims reimbursement, or charges for which he is seeking direct payment to the 
medical provider. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to Review or appeal. 
Richard G. Sumsioti 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of UtaJi, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
day of February, 1987. 
fJ§^ 
ATTEST: 
.rhda J. Sj^^sDurg 
Commissio^Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on February - ^ 1987, a copy of the attached 
Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was mailed to the 
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Sharon L. Heaton 
400 East Riverside, Apt. 513 
St. George, UT 84770 
Keith E. Sohm 
Attorney at Law 
2057 Lincoln Lane 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Robert W. Brandt 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Wausau Insurance 
404 East 4500 South, Suite A-34 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
B 
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ADDENDUM 7: 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAN, AND ORDER, 
NOVEMBER 18, 1985 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UtAH 
Case No. B85000588 & 7800969Q 
* 
SHARON L. HEATON * 
Applicant, * 
vs. * 
* 
BOYLE BROTHERS DRILLING COMPANY and/or * 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL INSURANCE OF WAUSAU * 
and SECOND INJURY FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. On May 3, 1979, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
were entered by Keith E. Sohm, Administrative Law Judge for the Industrial 
Commission, awarding to the Applicant permanent partial impairment benefits 
and medical expenses resulting from his industrial accident of 
October 6, 1975. In Judge Sohm's Finding of Fact he indicated that "from the 
above [medical panel] report and the other medical reports on file, it would 
appear that the Applicant is permanently and totally disabled and is entitled 
to disability compensation as indicated in the pdnel report and may be 
entitled to disability compensation from the Special Fund when benefits by the 
insurance carrier expire." For reasons not explained in the Findings of Fact 
entered by Judge Sohm, the Applicant was awarded permanent partial impairment 
benefits and he was not referred to Rehabilitation Services for evaluation as 
mandated by Section 35-1-67 U.C.A. Also, for inexplicable reasons, the 
Second Injury Fund was not joined as a party defendant lat that time. 
2. A Motion for Review of the Order entered by Judge Sohm was filed 
on behalf of the Applicant's attorney, claiming that the Applicant was in fact 
permanently and totally disabled and that he should be awarded benefits based 
on permanent total benefits. On July 18, 1979, ttje Commission entered a 
denial of the Motion for Review essentially affirming the Order entered by 
Judge Sohm but the denial specifically indicated the! issue of permanent and 
total disability would not be closed but that the Order would be allowed to 
run its course with benefits being paid out "somewhere in 1981 or the early 
part of 1982." (In fact, the benefits ordered were paid out as of 
October 5, 1981.) The Commission further specifically stated that it would 
"defer further consideration of this case to at least Mjarch 1, 1981. 
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After the date aforementioned, the Applicant may again file with the 
Commission for a determination of permanent partial or permanent total 
disability benefits." 
3. After the denial of the Motion for Review was entered, Counsel 
for the Applicant wrote to Judge Sohm inquiring as to whether or not there 
would be any benefits paid from the Secondary Fund over and above the award 
against the employer. Judge Sohm responded to Counsel's inquiry stating "the 
request for 100% disability rating was considered by both the Administrative 
Law Judge and the Industrial Commission in entering their respective Orders. 
Neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the Commission found the Applicant 
100% disabled and therefore was not entitled to an additional 40% from the 
Special Fund. When the Applicants benefits run out after 187.2 weeks, the 
Applicant may make application for additional benefits from the Special Fund 
and that application will be considered at that time." 
4. Thereafter an appeal of the Applicant's case was filed with the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
5. The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Writ of Review on 
the grounds that the Order of the Commission was not a Final Order and 
therefore not subject to appeal. The Motion to Dismiss was granted. 
6. On January 9, 1980, Judge Sohm advised the Attorney for the 
Defendants "The Commission's Order of July 18, 1979 is tentative and . . . 
additional medical reports and considerable updating will be required for the 
Commission and the parties to further evaluate the case. When new 
developments occur in the way of surgery or extraordinary medical treatment of 
the Applicant, the Commission should be advised of such and a petition should 
be sent specifically identifying what additional relief is sought." 
7. On January 17, 1980, Judge Sohm advised Counselor for the 
Applicant that "there is nothing in the Order nor in cur correspondence that 
suggests that we start another round of hearings at the present time since the 
case is now laid to rest. It is true that an Applicant can commence a new 
proceeding if the Applicant can show that his condition has substantially 
deteriorated since the last Order was entered. In such cases, the Applicant 
can file a new* Application for Hearing, but must accompany the Application 
with medical evidence showing a substantial worsening of the Applicant's 
condition." 
8. The Commission's file indicates that no further action was taken 
with regard to the Applicant's claim for permanent total disability until 
March 20, 1985 when he wrote to the Commission seeking clarification of his 
rights. Judge Sohm responded to his inquiry by letter dated April 1, 1985, 
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stating, "If you are seeking further compensation for your industrial injury, 
you should first have your treating physician provide you with a report 
indicating the nature of treatment that you were undergoing, that the 
treatment is related to your industrial injury and to give his opinion whether 
or not you are able to work and by his opinion if your condition has worsened 
since the Order was issued by the Commission in your case. All of that 
information should be provided to the insurance carrier, along with a request 
to reinstitute payment of medical bills and temporary total disability 
compensation. (The foregoing statement appears to have overlooked the fact 
that all compensation due from the insurance carrier hkd been paid 3-1/2 years 
earlier, except for the ongoing obligation for medical expenses.) 
9. On April 18, 1985, the Commission received a copy of a letter 
written by the Applicant to Utah Legal Services, Incorporated, seeking the 
assistance of Legal Services. 
10. The next document in the Commissions fil^ is a letter from Keith 
Sohm dated June 27, 1985, requesting a change of doctors on behalf of 
Mr. Heaton. This was followed the next day by an Application for Hearing for 
an award of permanent total disability and continued payment of medical 
bills. Judge Sohm retired as an Administrative Law Jfudge for the Commission 
in May of 1985. The Commission has no information &s to the circumstances 
leading to Mr. Sohm's appearance as attorney for Mr 
formal withdrawal of counsel filed by Mr. Heaton*s 
Eliason, but presumably Mr. Heaton learned of Judge SohnTs retirement and 
requested that he enter an appearance as counsel on his[behalf. 
Heaton. There is no 
former attorney, Eldon 
11. The attachment filed with the Application for Hearing alleged 
that the Applicant's condition had worsened and tpat the Applicant was 
entitled to additional compensation through October |6, 1981 in the sum of 
$21,762.62, plus benefits since that time totaling $25,691.25 or a total of 
$47,453.87, plus interest and ongoing benefits from the Second Injury Fund in 
the sum of $131.75 per week. 
12. It was difficult for the Defendants to filje an answer to the most 
recent Application for Hearing because the file had been closed over three 
years ago. Counsel for the Applicant requested that a default be entered 
against the Defendants but no action was taken with tfespect to this request 
because this Administrative Law Judge called Counsel for the Defendants by 
telephone and learned that to the best of his knowledge, the Defendants had 
satisfied in full their obligation as directed by Order of the Commission. At 
that time, of course, this Administrative Law Judge was entirely unfamiliar 
with all that had transpired in this long and complex case over the preceding 
ten years. It has since come to the attention of the Administrative Law Judge 
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that the Defendants did indeed comply fully with the terms of the prior Orders 
of the Commission relative to their obligation for payment of weekly benefits 
over the statutory maximum of 312 weeks. It is still somewhat unclear as to 
what medical bills were submitted, and the Defendants recognize that they have 
an ongoing responsibility for payment of medical expenses that can be 
reasonably attributed to Mr. Heaton's industrial accident. Some additional 
time may be required before the extent of this liability can be determined. 
It is rather clear, however, that the Defendants have paid a total of 
$38,718.37 in compensation benefits as previously ordered by Judge Sohm. 
13. On August 7, 1985, the Commission received a medical report from 
Dr. Ross McNaught, who examined the Applicant on July 25, 1985. The report 
reviews the Applicant's medical history and describes his current complaints 
and physical condition. Dr. McNaught states that "it is my opinion that his 
neurologic picture is deteriorating, particularly over the last couple of 
months, and I feel that if something is not done, very likely more complete 
paralysis may result as well as loss of bladder control, and he has already 
lost sexual function." The report, of course, does not really address the 
question of causal relationship between the Applicant's present complaints and 
the industrial accident but it does, at least, provide evidence of a 
deteriorating condition. Furthermore, the report provides no evidence of what 
change, if any, may have taken place in the Applicant's condition over the 
past six years. To expedite matters somewhat, the Administrative Law Judge 
asked the Administrator of the Second Injury Fund to review the Applicant's 
file and to advise the Administrative Law Judge if a Hearing would be 
necessary or if some matters could be determined without the necessity of a 
further hearing. Avoidance of a further hearing was a desirable objective 
inasmuch as Counsel for the Applicant has indicated Mr. Heaton is practically 
unable to travel, is relegated to the use of crutches and may soon be confined 
to a wheelchair. The Applicant currently resides in Kanab, Utah. The 
Administrator of the Second Injury Fund responded to the request of the 
Adminstrative Law Judge indicating that he was willing to waive any statutory 
requirements that Mr. Heaton be referred to Rehabilitation Services for 
evaluation and was willing to stipulate that the Applicant was permenantly and 
totally disabled. Questions reserved by the Administrator for determination 
by the Administrative Law Judge were (1) the date upon which the Applicant 
became permenantly and totally disabled entitling him to benefits from the 
Second Injury Fund, (2) the accrued amounts due, if any, (3) the interest due, 
if any, and (4) the medical expenses yet unpaid for which the Second Injury 
Fund may have some liability. 
14. In light of recently submitted information from the insurance 
carrier indicating that its liability has been fully discharged under the 
prior orders of the Commission except for the payment of medical expenses, and 
in light of the stipulation by the Administrator of the Second Injury Fund 
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that the Applicant is permenantly and totally disabled, the Administrative Law 
Judge finds that the Applicant, Sharon L. Heaton, is permenantly and totally 
disabled as a result of his industrial accident of October 6, 1975. The first 
and only new evidence of a deterioration in the Applicant's condition 
warranting such a finding is the letter from Dr. McNaught dated July 25, 
1985. At this time, the Administrative Law Judge does not believe the 
evidence warrants a finding of permanent total disability prior to that date. 
Furthermore, a finding of permanent total disability prior to that date even 
if warranted may not be to the benefit of the Applicant inasmuch as he has 
received Social Security benefits for much of the period of time in question 
and might stand to lose a substantial portion of those benefits because of the 
offset claimed by the Social Security Administration in light of a Workmen's 
Compensation award. This problem, however, can be addressed subsequently if 
necessary. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
No interest is payable on the accrued amount djie. One hundred percent 
of the medical expenses shall continue to be the obligation of the Defendants, 
Boyle Brothers Drilling Company and/or Wausau Insurance Company, but the 
Administrative Law Judge acknowledges that the Defendants may be entitled to 
an allocation of this liability on the basis of the Applicant's pre-existing 
condition. This issue is currently on appeal before the Utah Supreme Court 
and the Commission will specifically reserve the right of the Defendants to 
petition the Commission for an' allocation of its liability at such time, and 
on condition that, the Supreme Court interprets Section 35-1-69 as imposing a 
mandatory obligation for allocation of medical expense? regardless of the fact 
that the pre-existing condition contributed nothing to the need for such 
medical expenses. In this case, the pre-existing condition was an injury to 
the Applicant's index finger which was nearly amputated and this condition has 
no relationship to the medical expenses incurred by the Applicant following 
his industrial accident. 
Applicant is entitled to permanent total disability benefits from and 
after July 25, 1985 in accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact. The 
applicable rate of compensation is the statutory maximum at the time of his 
injury of $131.75 per week. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury 
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing th0 State Treasurer, as 
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to place Applicant on the Second Injury 
Fund payroll and pay Applicant compensation at the rape of $131.75 per week, 
commencing July 25, 1985 and continuing thereafter at intervals of no more 
than every four weeks for as long as the Applicant shall live. The accrued 
amount, through November 7, 1985 of $1,9 76.25, less attorney,s fees shall be 
payable in a lump sum. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants pay all medical expenses 
incurred as the result of this accident; said expenses to be paid in 
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Scedule of this Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Keith E. Sohm, attorney for the Applicant, 
be paid the sum of $395.25. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Richard G. Sums ion 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
jiay of November, 1985. 
ADDENDUM 8: 
IIEDICAL PANEL REPORT 
NOVEMBER 7 , 1986 
Adull JVeuroloau 
Carotid Ultrasound 
jValLnielJt. jVorJ, JOJb.. \P.C 
(Suite 1 
70 Joutk Mntk £asi 
Ja/t lake Citu, %ak 84/02-/386 
80/-363-3777 
f>le ~irrencebha 'oa -at hit 
(jiecli omuoarujiku' 
November 7, 1986 
Judge Richard G. Sumsion 
Administrative Law Judge 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
RE: Sharon L. Heaton 
INJ: 10/06/75 
EMP: Boyles Brothers Drilling 
Dear Judge Sumsion: 
As per your request, I performed a 
Panel Evaluation on the case of Mr. Shar 
September 26, 1986. 
supplemental Medical 
Ion L. Heaton on 
To form the basis for my later comments, it is neces-
sary that I briefly review the aspects ot the industrial in-
cident which occurred on October 6, 1975i, and the report of 
the Medical Panel submitted to Judge Keifeh E. Sohm on March 
5, 1979. 
As a consequence of a fall while catrying two one 
hundred pound sacks of drilling mudf Mr. Heaton sustained a 
cervical herniation at C4-5 and C5-6 levels. The herniated 
disc fragments were excised, and intervertebral fusion was 
performed at both levels on November 17, 1976. Symptoms 
were only partially improved, and persistence of symptoms in 
the left upper extremity led to a diagnosis of thoracic out-
let syndrome, for which a surgical attempt at relief was per-
formed by excising a portion of the left]first rib, in 
August 1977. Symptoms were only partially improved. When 
he appeared for the Medical Panel, Mr. Heaton reported neck 
pain extending to both arms, left more than right, head-
aches, restricted range of motion, inability to perform even 
light activities, weakness in both arms, left more than 
right, numbness along the ulnar distribution (presumably bi-
laterally), and posterior left lower extremity pain. 
Judge Richard G. Sumsion -2- November 7, 1986 
(Heaton) 
Examination was described as follows. Mr. Heaton main-
tained his neck in one position all of the time, with neck *• 
flexion to 30 degrees, extension to 20 degrees, rotation to' 
40 degrees and lateral bending to 30 degrees. Occipital and 
cervical spine tenderness was reported. Range of motion of 
the shoulders was normal. Deep tendon reflexes were sym-
metrically present. Left grip strength was reduced by ap-
proximately 50 per cent of the strength demonstrated on the 
right. Winging of the left scapula was identified. The 
left radial artery pulse was diminished but not obliterated 
by deep inspiration and depression of the left shoulder. 
Range of motion of the lumbar spine was normal. 
Mr. Heaton was judged to have problems related primari-
ly to thoracic outlet syndrome with some symptoms suggestive 
of carpal tunnel syndrome, while winging of the left scapula 
was felt to be secondary to excision of the first rib for 
treatment of thoracic outlet syndrome. 
The Panel found Mr. Heaton to be 60 per cent permanent-
ly partially disabled as a consequence of the industrial in-, 
jury of October 6, 1975, with an additional 7 per cent due 
to pre-existing amputation of the distal phalanx of the 
right index finger. Medications, physical therapy, but not 
additional surgical intervention were recommended by the 
Panel. 
As a result of your recent decision, Mr. Heaton has 
been judged to be 100 per cent permanently disabled. This 
examiner is now asked to determine whether Mr. Heaton's 
physical impairment is more, less, or about the same as it 
was in March of 1979. 
Mr. Heaton reports that he has not received any treat-
ment for his condition other than to have several pre-
scriptions for analgesic and skeletal muscle relaxant medi-
cations written by Dr. Howard L. Roberts. 
Mr. Heaton describes his condition to be basically un-
changed from 1979, with no new symptoms having developed, al-
though previously reported symptoms have intensified. These 
consist of: 
-intermittent numbness of the third, fourth and 
fifth digits of both hands, left more than right, 
with static posturing; 
-intermittent numbness of both lower extremities 
producing weakness; 
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-diminished sexual performance^ 
-constant lightheadedness without v^r'cigo; 
-severe bilateral neck pain intensified by 
movement; 
-inconstant low back pain produced by sitting, 
bending or standing; 
-impaired sensation on urination without bowel 
problems; 
-shoulder pain extending into tlhe upper extremi-
ties which he believes are du4 to either bursitis 
or arthritis; 
-severe pains in the lower extremities bilateral-
ly, intermittently, but quite (frequently; 
-daily suboccipital and generalized head pain; 
-inability to walk except with Icrutches (although 
crutches were not brought to tqe office on the 
date of this evaluation). 
•necessity of patient's wife td 
ing and other personal activitl 
assist in shower-
ies. 
Poor hearing and poor vision which He relates to age 
factors are reported, and otherwise Mr. Hfleaton reports no 
health problems. Medications consist of aspirin, Tylenol, 
Norflex. 
Examination revealed a depressed appjearing man who sat 
virtually no head 
Isure was 150/90. 
with head and neck partially flexed, with 
and neck movement observable. Blood press 
Heart, lungs and abdominal examinations were normal. 
Subclavicular area pulsations were present in the anterior 
chest bilaterally. Extremity examination was normal with 
the exception of dehiscence of a left deltoid surgical in-
cision site. No atrophy of upper or lower extremity was not-
ed, although Mr. Heaton reported that his 
were previously twice their 37 centimeter 
The distal phalanx of the right index finger is missing. 
Examination of the neck revealed well-healed right anterior 
surgical sites. There was no palpable muscle spasm in the 
cervical region. When requested to extend, rotate left or 
right, or tilt head and neck left or right Mr. Heaton stated 
biceps muscles 
circumference. 
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he was totally unable to do so. He was abLe to flex the 
head and neck 30 degrees. Inspection of tne lou back re-
vealed percussion tenderness in the lumbar regioxi with no 
muscle spasm palpated. He was able to bend from the waist 
to a point 40 degrees from upright. 
Cranial nerve and funduscopic examinations were normal. 
Motor examination revealed no atrophy, no fasciculations, 
and a totally factitious give-and-go weakness when all 
muscle groups of all extremities were tested. It is not an 
exaggeration to describe the apparent weakness as being of 
such a degree that the effort to resist passive movements 
could have been overcome by a child weighing not more than 
50 pounds. He was unable to accomplish heel-to-shin ma-
neuvers when lying supine, as he appeared unable to elevate 
the legs. When he walked there was a tendency to drag both 
lower extremities, and the gait was slow, widebased, with 
stooped posture. Rigidity, cogwheeling and tremor were not 
noted in upper extremities. Mr. Heaton reported dullness to 
pin prick in the upper chest bilaterally to the level of the 
fifth rib, and dullness in the lower extremities, left more 
than right, but not upper extremities. Parietal examination 
was normal. Deep tendon reflexes were 1+ in the upper ex-
tremities, 1-2+ at the knees, 1+ at the right ankle and 
trace to 1+ at the left ankle. Babinski responses were ab-
sent. No vascular bruits were heard in the neck. 
An objective evaluation of physical impairment is quite 
impossible based upon the present examination circumstances. 
Furthermore, I cannot comprehend on what basis the 1975 
Medical Panel members assigned a 60 per cent permanent 
partial impairment rating as a consequence of the industrial 
injury of October 6, 1975. Additionally, the finger ampu-
tation should have been rated at 5 per cent permanent 
partial impairment, and not 7 per cent as recommended. 
There is no doubt that injury to the neck occurred, arfd 
that the cervical fusion at two levels and left first rib re-
section were accomplished to alleviate symptoms. The degree 
of permanent partial impairment would seem to be much less 
than 60 per cent, and more likely in the range of 20-30 per 
cent. 
In terms of reasonable medical probability, responses 
to your questions are as follows: 
1) There is no significant change in Mr. Heatonfs per-
manent physical impairment. Symptoms of dysfunction are re-
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ported to be increased, while objective phanges in physical 
examination cannot be appreciated• 
2) No determination possible except as noted above. 
3) The applicant was not rendered unemployable as of 
October 1, 1981, or subsequent there to, on the basis of 
physical impairment. However, intensified symptoms, the 
patient's perceptions of disability and attitudes regarding 
return to work lightly rendered him unemployable. 
4) The treatment rendered by Dr. Roberts is related 
to the October 6, 1975 accident. 
5) The use of analgesics and muscle relaxant medi-
cations are related to the October 6, 1975 accident. 
6) Future treatment necessitated by Mr. Heaton's ac-
cidents would be limited to medications pnly. 
NATHANIEL M. NORD, M.D. 
NMN:lh 
ADDENDUM 9: 
MEDICAL PANEL REPORT 
MARCH 5, 1979 
JOHN R. REAM, M.D. 
HAND SURGERY 
ORTHOPEDIC SURGERY 
EDWARD A. HEYES, M.D. 
:OPEDIC SURGERY 
ORTHOPEDIC SURGERY 
ST. MARK'S MEDICAL OFFICE 
1220 EAST 3900 SOUTH 4 C 
SUITE 4C 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84117 
Telephone 262-2511 
March 5, 1979 
Keith E. Sohm, Administrative Law Judge 
Utah State Industrial Commission 
350 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Sherrin Heaton 
(Injury - 10-6-75) 
(Employee - Boyle Bros. Drilling) 
Dear Judge Sohm; 
Dr. Edward Heyes, Marion L. Walker and I meid this morning as a 
medical panel to examine Mr, Sherrin L. Heatpn, and review his 
industrial injury. 
Mr. Heaton related that on October 6, 1975, 
100 pound sacks of drilling mud when he sli 
not sure exactly how he fell, but he does 
landed on top of him and he may have hit his 
sat down for a few minutes and noted pain in 
He also had a headache. He was able to get 
drilling mud, one sack at a time afterwards 
approximately two hours that day, when the w 
Over the next day or two he became worse and 
pain with a headache extending dorsally to h 
not have a great deal of trouble with his 
saw Dr. McHenry 1-2 days after the injury 
were felt to be negative. He was referred 
and he placed him in the hospital for 2-3 
treated conservatively for his neck pain for 
fie was carrying two 
piped and fell. He is 
recall that the sacks 
pead and neck. He 
his neck and head, 
jap and carry the 
I He worked for 
fiole crew had quit. 
developed more neck 
)LS eyes. He did 
at that time. He 
x-rays at that time 
Dr. Mendenhall 
s. He was then 
sometime. 
arm 
and 
tb 
day 
He was later referred to Dr. Gaufin, who per 
which demonstrated "large extradural defect 
areas bilaterally". On November 17, 19 76, 
discs were excised and the intravertebral 
ormed a myelogram 
kt the C-4,5 and C-5,6 
the C-4,5 and C-5,6 
spaces were fused. 
Mr. Heaton was improved for a period of time 
have significant symptoms in his neck extend 
arms. He particularly has problems with the 
is left handed and he was never able to retuin 
but he continues to 
ng down into his 
left aim. Mr. Heaton 
to work. 
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Mr. Heaton was then referred to Dr. Fullmer for treatment of a left 
thoracic outlet syndrome. In August 1977, Dr. Fullmer excised 
his left first rib. He felt that this helped for 1-2 weeks but 
it was not really much better. 
In general, Mr. Heaton has become progressively worse with time, 
and he has been unable to do even light activities. Presently 
he complains primarily of pain in his neck, extending down into 
both arms, left being worse than right. He complains of pain 
extending into his head with frequent severe headaches. He 
feels that he is worse in the morning on waking, and that his 
symptoms are always present to some degree, but that oftentimes 
it is more severe than at other times. He feels that he has little 
motion of hdsjneck and that any significant activity increases his 
symptoms. He finds that he is unable to do even light things at 
home and that he must frequently get up and move about to help 
minimize his symptoms. 
Mr. Heaton also complains of weakness in both arms, the left 
being much worse than the right. He has noted numbness particularly 
in the ulnair area. He has had some pain in his left leg 
posteriorly. He finds that he must sleep in certain positions 
to gain the maximum of relief and often has a pillow under his 
left arm. He feels that he has become progressively worse over 
the period of time since his accident. 
Mr. Heaton has not had any serious illnesses and has not had any 
significant trauma or fractures. He did have a hernia repair 
and has had several fatty tumors excised. He described an 
injury to his neck approximately 10 years ago, when he was buried 
in a trench. He did have occasional discomfort from his neck and 
headaches, but he did not have any shoulder pain. He did not 
lose any work from this injury and did do work which strained 
his neck significantly. He did injure his index finger, in an 
accident that nearly amputated this finger. He did have surgery 
and has since had rather marked stiffness of his index finger. 
He does not smoke or use alcohol. 
On examination, Mr. Heaton was found to be a well developed, 
well nourished, moderately obese man, who maintained his neck 
in one position essentially all the time. He is 6 feet 2 inches 
in height and weight is 272 pounds. His neck flexed to 30 degrees 
and extended to 20 degrees and it rotated to 4 5 degrees in each 
direction. Lateral bends in both directions were to approximately 
30 degrees. Mr. Heaton had moderate difficulty in performing this 
ROM. He did have tenderness over the occipital regions and 
complained of numbness in this area. In general his tenderness was 
found in the cervical spine. The right shoulder shrug was significant 
greater than the left. He had a full ROM of both shoulders with 
that exception. The right upper arm measured 35%cm. and the left 37%c 
The right forearm measured 33^cm. as did the left. Some tenderness 
was present in the lateral epicondyle. Firm gripping produced some 
discomfort in the left forearm. DTRs were noted at the triceps being 
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DTRs of the lower extremities were also equajl. 
Grip strength averaged approximately 20kg. oln the right and 11kg. on 
the left. Winging of his left scapula was noted with forward 
pressure on his hand. A diminution of the pulse of his left radial 
artery was noted with deep inspiration and depression os his 
left shoulder. 
ROM of his lumbar spine was normal, 
in his lower extremity. 
DTRs wefe equal bilaterally 
Mr. Heaton was felt by the industrial panel to have problems 
primarily related to a thoracic outlet syndrome of the brachial 
plexus neuritis. He did give some symptoms suggestive of a carpal 
tunnel syndrome, including waking up at night, increased numbness 
with use of his hand, and increased symptoms in certain positions 
of his hand. We felt that the winging of hip scapula and possibly 
the &&crease in shoulder shrug was secondary to the surgery 
resecting the first rib. 
Assuming, but not deciding that the applicant was involved in the 
events as alleged, the panel finds that the applicant is approximately 
67% disabled. The panel would attribute approximately 60% of his 
permanent physical impairment to the industrial injury occurring 
on October 6, 1975. Approximately 7% impairment would be attributed 
to the injury to his finger. The panel finds that the applicant has 
been totally disabled since the injury on October 6, 1975. The 
injury has been stable since March 1978, and the panel feels this 
is approximately the time the permanent partial impairment began. 
The panel cannot at this time recommend any surgical procedure, 
because it feels further testing would be necessary before making 
such recommendations. We feel it would be helpful to have repeat 
nerve conduction and electromyelogram studies 
also be helpful to rule out any residual or 
A myelogram may 
ierve root compression, 
X-rays were not available for the panel to review. Depending on 
the findings, surgery may be of some benefit The pulse on the 
left side is clearly diminished with inspiration and depression of 
the left shoulder, and repeat exploration of this area may be of 
significant benefit. If this surgery were indicated, the panel 
would consider it related to the episode of October 6, 197 5. 
The panel would consider all the applicants present complaints to 
be causally connected to the industrial injury. Mr. Heaton will 
continue to require pain medication, muscle Relaxants, tranquilizers 
and physical therapy. 
.ncgel >elY|/ 
m R. 
Edward A. 
Marion WatLker, M.D 
ADDENDUM 10: 
INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EVALUATION 
(DR. CHESTER B. POWELL), 
JUNE 23, 1978 
CHESTER B POWELL M D 
M PETER HEILBRUN M D 
ROBERT S HOOD M D 
CONSULTANT 
HEODORE 5 ROBERTS M D 
NEUROSURGICAL CLINIC OF UTAH, INC 
975 EAST FIRST SOUTH 
SALT L A K E CITY, U T A H 84102 
D I A L (801) 531 7806 
June 23 , 1|978 
E m p l o y e r s Insurance o f Wausau 
535 East 4500 South 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84107 
A t t en t i on : P a t r i c k Barnes 
C l a i m Representa t i ve 
Re : Sharbn Heaton 
Cla i r r j : B53-162416 
Emp: Boyles B ro the rs D r i l l i n g Co, 
D / I : October 6 , 1975 
Dear M r . Barnes : 
A s a r ranged by y o u r l e t t e r of r e f e r r a l May 30 J M r . Heaton was seen on 
June 2 0 . Thank you f o r a r rang ing to have past r eco rds f o r w a r d e d . 
T h i s 4 2 - y e a r - o l d , l e f t - handed , unemployed d r i l j l e r descr ibes ch ron ic 
symp toms w i t h d i s a b i l i t y dated to i ndus t r i a l i n j u r y approx ima te l y fc/vo and 
a ha l f yea rs ago: 
1 . ,TWeakness and numbness in hands, moife on the le f t ; 
2 . , ! Pain in the neck and shou lder w i thou t rlnuch neck movement ; 
3 . "Headaches . " 
H i s to r y : 
On October 6 , 1975, M r . Heaton was w o r k i 
ing a couple of 100-pound sacks of mud when he 
landing on h is ches t . He states he was able to f i n i sh the day out but f e l t 
weak and was aware of cont inued pa in in the neqk and ches t . 
fig on a d r i l l r i g and c a r r y -
s l ipped and f e l l , the sacks 
As these symptoms pe rs i s ted he saw D r . David 
h i m to D r . Mendenha l l . X - r a y s w e r e taken and 
mended w i thout much e f fec t , and he in t u r n r e f e r r e d M r 
G a u f i n , P rovo neurosu rgeon . 
H e n r i e , who then r e f e r r e d 
conserva t i ve measures recom-
Heaton to D r . Lvnn 
On the basis of f u r t h e r s t u d i e s , D r . Gauf in recolmmended and c a r r i e d out 
c e r v i c a l d isc surgery by a n t e r i o r approach in Npvember 1976. M r . Heaton 
says he had " t e m p o r a r y r e l i e f . " 
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and the pat ien t was then r e f e r r e d to D r . F u l l m e r and in Augus t 1977, a 
l e f t f i r s t r i b resec t i on was c a r r i e d out by t r a n s a x i l l a r y approach f o r a 
t ho rac i c ou t le t p r o b l e m . 
In sp i te of these m e a s u r e s , the p. t ient has never imp roved s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
o r r e tu rned to w o r k , and he desc r ibes h is cont inu ing s y m p t o m s , now: 
1 . Uppe r E x t r e m i t i e s / H a n d s - D i f fuse numbness but greates t in the 
t h i r d to the f o u r t h and f i f t h f i n g e r s , b i l a t e r a l l y , and along the 
u l n a r s ide of the hand . Numbness is r e l i e v e d on l y ing down , 
but becomes seve re when the pat ient is a c t i v e . He has been u n -
able to do many t h i ngs , "even h u n t i n g . " T h e r e is a good deal 
o f d i s c o m f o r t in the upper e x t r e m i t i e s , neck and s h o u l d e r s , and 
w i t h much neck movemen t , the d i s c o m f o r t extends upward as 
a headache. 
2 . Neck - Is unable to move the neck to any d e g r e e , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
extending i t . T h i s movement o r ro ta t i on reproduces pain and 
s t i f f n e s s . 
3 . Low Back - Pa t ien t a lso desc r ibes cont inu ing pain in the l u m -
bar r e g i o n . T h i s is non rad ia t i ng , unaccompanied by any l o w e r 
e x t r e m i t y s y m p t o m s , and apparen t l y has never been s t u d i e d . 
M r . Heaton says a i l o f h is symp toms a r e w o r s e . He is not p resen t l y on 
ac t ive t r e a t m e n t o r the rapy and has not re tu rned to w o r k . 
He has had f o l l o w - u p X - r a y s but no f u r t h e r myelography o r E M G . 
Pas t H i s t o r y : 
M e d i c a l . Good heal th w i t h no ch ron i c d iseases except that s ince h is 
acc ident h is "nerves are t e r r i b l e . " 
Other S u r g e r y . H e r n i o r r h a p h y , r e p a i r of i n j u r i es to f i n g e r s , s u p e r f i c i a l 
l i p o m a s . -f 
O ther T r a u m a . None. ^ ' -»* * 
F a m i l i a l H i s t o r y . Nega t i ve , no f a m i l i a l h i s t o r y o f neuro log ic d i s e a s V o r 
deafness . 
S y s t e m s . Says hear ing is down and that he has a " c h i r p i n g b i r d " t inn i tus 
f o r the l a s t two y e a r s . A p p i r e n t l y both ears a re invo lved and t h e r e a r e no 
assoc ia ted s y m p t o m s . 
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Has var iably chest pains but no abdominal complaints. No sphincter i m -
pai rments. Reports no al lergies or drug sens i t iv i t ies . 
Examination: 
la rge , somewhat obese ear ly S ix feet three inches, 250 pounds: A very 
middle-aged male in no apparent d ist ress; however, he consistently keeps 
his neck wel l flexed at a l l t imes. 
Physical Examination. The patient has wel l healed r ight anter ior cerv ical 
and lef t ax i l lary surgical scars . 
Head and neck are normal except for cerv ical posture. Crania l or i f ices are 
negative. Carot id pulsations are of good quality without b ru i t . 
The patient has marked l imi ta t ion in range of cfervical mobi l i t y , especially 
fo r extension, but he is unable to rotate the neck more than approximately 
20 degrees to either side or t i l t i t toward the shoulder, especially on the 
lef t on account of pain. 
The shoulder g i rd le Is normal and there is no evidence of per iphera l , vas -
cular or jo in t ds ease. 
Chest is c lear . Heart tones and breath sounds 
Abdomen is obese but nontender wi th no palpabl 
are wi th in normal l im i ts 
0 masses. 
Neurologic Examination. Cranial nerwes are in|tact except for mi ld reduc-
tion of a i r conduction b i la tera l ly . 
In the upper extremit ies the patient shows questionable stretch reflexes 
and has bi lateral hypesthesia along the ulnar aspect of the forearms and 
hands. This appears to correspond more to a rpot distr ibut ion than to r e -
f lect an ulnar neuropathy. 
The patient has good abdominal ref lexes, normajl strength, sensation, and 
muscle tone in the lower ex t remi t ies . The r ight ankle j e rk is quite s lug -
g ish , the lef t ankle j e r k is absent v i th the patienjt kneeling. Sciat ic stretch 
sign is negative. 
The low back shows normal posture, good muscje tone with6ut :spasm, and 
an adequate range of mot ion. . 
Supplemental Data: / * \ / "'-' ..
 N\* 
D r . Lynn Gaufin saw the patient on March 1 . 1976, noting that X- rays 
showed "moderate degenerative changes at C4-5J-6.n He has progress 
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notes describing l i t t l e improvement on conservative management, and in 
October recommended hospital ization for more definit ive studies including 
a myelogram. EMGs had shown nerve root compromise, and myelography 
is described as showing " large extradural defects" at C4-5 and C5-6 , b i -
la te ra l l y . Spinal f lu id protein was 52 mg%. The patient was readmitted 
and on November 17, 1976 had the C4-5 and C5-6 discs excised anter io r ly 
wi th fus ion. 
D r . Gaufin noted evidence early suggesting a le f t thoracic outlet syndrome, 
and wi th persistence of these symptoms refer red the patient to D r . Mark 
Fu l lmer for the la ter f i r s t r ib resect ion. 
X - ray reports are included but the X- rays have not been received fo r 
rev iew. 
D r . Eugene Chapman saw M r . Heaton on February 16, 1978 and notes the 
marked l imi ta t ion in range of cerv ica l mobi l i ty and l imi ted range of shoul -
der motion wi th weakness of the lef t g r ip and absent upper extremity r e -
f lexes. X - rays show fusion at C4-5-6 and a r th r i t i c spurr ing and disc nar -
rowing at C6-7 . 
Comment: 
I t would appear f r om the history provided by the jatient and his wife and 
f rom the records avai lable, that the patient remains disabled, not s igr i f i cant ly 
improved following the past surg ical procedures, and actually may wel l be 
worse. This is a most unusual course for s imple cerv ical disc disease, and 
raises a number of questions: 
- Does the patient have sign if lcant pathology at other levels, e . g . 
spondylosis at C6-7? 
- A re there other coincidental diseases such as rheumatoid spon-
dyl i t is? 
- Is there some basis for revers ing the patientTs present disabi l i ty? 
A t present, M r . Heaton is totally disabled fo r any physical labor and p rob-
ably would be unable to per form nonphysical sedentary work on the account 
his chronic pain and cerv ical symptoms. There is nothing to suggest that 
this d isabi l i ty w i l l d imin ish spontaneously in the fu ture . 
It would seem appropriate after this ten-month postoperative interval fo l low-
ing the last procedure without improvement to reassess the patient's condi-
tion attempting to answer the above questions and hopefully findings a basis 
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for reducing the patient's present d isabi l i ty . I would strongly recommend 
such a thorough reevaluation to include: 
a . Current EMG and myelography; 
b. Current medical evaluation; 
c . Current consultation depending upon results of the above, which 
might ind ude neurologic, orthopedic, and psychiatric opinions. 
d . Depending upon f indings, the patient micjht be a candidate for 
fur ther specific t reatment. 
A t present Mr* Heaton is total ly disabled and unless some medical basis 
for improving his disabi l i ty is determined, this w i l l probably go on as a 
permanent total disabil ity. 
These comments should answer questions posed in the let ter of re fe r ra l 
wi th the exception of that concerning the relationship of the thoracic syn -
drome to t rauma. While i t is hard to explain on the basis of presently 
available data a mechanism by which such an in jury could produce a thor-
acic outlet syndrome, i t would appear on the basis of the chronologic s e -
quence that i t probably was secondary to the in jury . 
Impression: 
1 . H is to ry of in jury sustained October 6, 1975 in a fell with a c rush-
ing effect over the upper trunk and neck, and wi th: 
a . Apparent symptomatic act ivat ion of cervical spondylosis; 
b. Apparent symptomatic activation of l^ft thoracic outlet 
syndrome. 
2 . History of C4-5 and C5-6 disc excision and fusion, November T76; 
and left f i r s t r ib resect ion, August f77. 
3 . Persistent, severe, cerv ical pain and l imi tat ion in range of motion 
wi th c l in ical evidence of b i lateral cerv ical radiculopathy, etiology 
not c l in ica l ly cer ta in , with presently total d isabi l i ty . 
I appreciate your asking me to see M r . Heaton. I hope I have answered 
your questions, but this is a complicated case and if you have other ques-
t ions, I would be happy to hear f rom you. 
CCk 
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I would hope very much that this man has a current reassessment carr ied 
out since at present I would not consider him to have reached a point of 
maximal improvement. 
Cord ia l ly , 
Chester B. Powel l , M . D . 
CBP:mj 
cc: Utah Industrial Commission 
ADDENDUM 11: 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S LETTER 
JANUARY 9,1986 
)L-
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
NORMAN H BANGERTER, GOVERNOR STEPHLN M HADIEY ( I I M R M W 
WALTER T A X E L G A R D COMMISSIONER 
L L NIELSEN COMMISSIONER 
January 9, 1986 
Keith E. Sohm, Attorney at Law 
2057 Lincoln Lane 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Re: Sharon L. He&ton 
Inj: 10/06/75 
Emp: Boyle Brothers Drilling Company 
Dear Mr* Sohm: 
I am in receipt of your Motion for Review of my Order of November 18, 
1985 . I am talcing the matter under advisement pending receipt of additional 
information. 
First, you know perfectly well there was }io collusion on the part of 
myself and the Administrator of the Second Injury Fund, and I am offended by 
your unfounded allegation of highly inappropriate and unethical conduct. If 
you want to talk about ethics, you might explain how you came to repr^ent 
Mr. Heaton in the first place. 
Second, there is no issue* relative to the payment of medical bills. 
The bilAe ^ fcjiat have oeen incurred as a result of Mr. Heaton's industrial 
accident will be paid. The problem is, the carrier has not received 
sufficient information to make this determination; but I note from 
Mr. Brandt's letter of November 13, 1985, that |such information has been 
requested from the doctors. Had the doctors furnished the information in the 
first instance, I have to assume that there would have been no issue. 
Third, I did not deny the Applicant an opportunity for a hearing. I 
simply asked Mr. Boorman to review the file for the purpose of accepting or 
rejecting Mr. Heaton's claim for permanent total disability. He accepted 
liability, and I assumed I was expediting a determination by entering an Order 
to that effect rather than setting the matter down for hearing. I did not 
make the Order retroactive because I had no evidence to support such an 
order. This can still be done if medical evidence is submitted in support of 
the claim, but I have not done so at this point in time in compliance with 
your own determinations in this matter when you were the Administrative Law 
Judge. Many years ago you advised Mr. Heaton that he would need to present 
medical evidence in support of his claim for permanent total disability, and I 
am giving you that same advice at this time, requiring no more nor no less. 
On the issue of attorney's fees, I suggest that with your response to 
this letter you furnish me with an itemized statement of your time and the 
services rendered on behalf of Mr. Heaton so that that information will be on 
hand at the time a supplemental order is entered in this matter. 
Keith E. Sohm 
January 9, 1986 
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I must concede that in reviewing the file it does appear that 
Mr. Heaton is not only permanently and totally disabled at this time but has 
been from the time of his industrial injury. What I do not understand is why 
you determined as the Administrative Law Judge why he was not permanently and 
totally disabled. An explanation in that regard would be helpful to me. 
I would also like to know what Social Security disability benefits, 
if any, Mr. Heaton has been or is receiving over the past four years. 
BY DIRECTION: 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By -ifMCJ' /f ' v/ 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Administrative Law Judge 
RGS:ds 
